# Guidebook on 'NGO Standards for Safety and Security'

Version 1.1.0 – September 2020
**Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security (JaNISS)**

## Contents

## About JaNISS

Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security (JaNISS) is an independent network of like-minded Japanese NGOs active in the field of international humanitarian and development assistance. The objective of JaNISS is to support and coordinate capacity development so as to ensure safety and security management under international standards in the Japanese NGO community. To that end, it conducts activities such as drawing up safety and security standards and organizing safety and security management training for Japanese NGOs, and it also carries out advocacy in Japanese society to promote safety and security management by NGOs.
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## Acknowledgement

This Guidebook is a result of collaborative efforts by JaNISS member NGOs. Development of the guidebook was managed by MOSS (Minimum Operating Security Standards) Task Force members throughout the drafting process, comprising: ADRA Japan, Japan International Volunteer Center, Japan Platform, Peace Winds Japan, Save the Children Japan, and World Vision Japan, co-led by Peace Boat Disaster Relief Volunteer Center, Shanti Volunteer Association and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

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## Abbreviations

CHS: Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability
CIMP: Critical Incident Management Plan
CIMT: Critical Incident Management Team
eCentre: UNHCR Regional Centre for Emergency Preparedness
ECHO: Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations
GISF: Global Interagency Security Forum
GPR8: Good Practice Review 8
HF: High Frequency
IFRC: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
INSO: International NGO Security Organization
ISAF: International Security Assistance Force
JaNISS: Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security
Medevac: Medical Evacuation
MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOSS: Minimum Operating Security Standards
MOU: Memorandum of Understanding
NRC: Norwegian Refugee Council
PRT: Provincial Reconstruction Team
PSEA: Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
PTSD: Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
R&R: Rest and Recreation
SIF: Safety in the Field
SLT: 'Saving Lives Together'
SOPs: Standard Operating Procedures
SRA: Security Risk Assessment
SRM: Security Risk Management
TOR: Terms of Reference
UNDSS: United Nations Department of Safety and Security
VHF: Very High Frequency

# Aims of this Guidebook and How to Use It

## 1. Aims of this Guidebook

The 'NGO Standards for Safety and Security' (hereafter Standards) were adopted by the member NGOs of Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security (JaNISS). The Standards capture the most common denominators in the internationally accepted safety and security standards, where the signatory NGOs are expected to develop their own policies and mechanisms.

The Standards intend to complement existing safety and security frameworks of signatory NGOs which should be specific and unique to each organization.

The Standards is made of following seven Standards: 'Commitment to Safety and Security', 'Organizational Safety and Security Policies and Plans', 'Resources', 'Human Resources Management', 'Accountability', 'Collaboration with Other Actors', and 'Safety and Security of Local Partner Organizations'.

Each NGO is ultimately responsible for determining how the seven Standards will be met within their own organization. How this is accomplished will be based on the mission, mandate, values and risk tolerance of each organization.

This Guidebook on 'NGO Standards for Safety and Security' (hereafter Guidebook) has been produced by the member NGOs of JaNISS to support Japanese NGOs in translating these seven Standards into tangible actions. This Guidebook also includes following objectives:

- To assist individual Japanese NGOs, self-evaluate the extent to which they have covered the safety and security policies and procedures that should be considered according to the Standards, and to locate suggested guidance, tools and resources when they identify room for improvement.
- To provide Japanese NGOs with references to relevant documents and online information accumulated by the United Nations organizations and international NGOs.
- To introduce, and encourage the introduction of, methods and ideas related to safety and security which have not been fully incorporated by Japanese NGOs such as security risk analysis, security planning and reviewing involving all relevant staff members, security related training, and clear definition of the security roles and responsibilities of managers and staff members.

Based on consultation with a wide range of humanitarian and development NGOs, this Guidebook also aims to achieve following goals:

- Applicable not only to Japanese NGOs working in conflict or high-risk areas but also to those who work in the overseas humanitarian and development operations.
- Applicable to various Japanese NGOs regardless of their organizational size and operational scale, category of staff (from paid to unpaid), presence in the field (expatriate or mission-based), and organization's mission and mandate (from emergency relief to study tour).

- Informative to Japanese NGOs located outside the metropolitan area where access to materials on security management has been limited and to assist their capacity-building efforts by providing relevant information on guidelines, tools and resources.

## 2. What this Guidebook covers

This Guidebook intends to cover following aspects of security management and practice:

- This Guidebook intends to cover most aspects of security management and practice that are commonly thought relevant to Japanese NGOs working in humanitarian and development operations.
- This Guidebook intends to cover both national/local and international staff equally, unless it is explicitly referred to one or the other group.
- This Guidebook intends to focus mainly on 'security' rather than 'health and safety' issues (see the definitions of 'safety' and 'security' in Standard 2.1, Guidance Note 1).
- This Guidebook is comprised of existing good practices drawn extensively from security policies and manuals produced by network NGOs such as InterAction and European Interagency Security Forum (EISF), humanitarian NGOs, UN agencies and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.

## 3. What this Guidebook does not cover

At the same time, this Guidebook does not intend to cover following aspects of security management and practice:

- This Guidebook is general in nature, and its contents may neither be applicable to all situations nor cover aspects of security management and practice that are specific to particular locations, cultures, or type of humanitarian or development operations. Its contents should be modified and adapted as appropriate, to suit the needs of particular organizations and situations.
- This Guidebook is intended neither to provided off-the-shelf safety and security standards and policies for individual NGOs nor impose certain standards or policies on individual NGOs. It offers suggested guideline, tools and resources, designed to assist organizations to think through their security policies and procedures. Each organization has different operational context, mission and mandate, operational period, financial and human resources, and involvement into various aid and local networks, and their security policies and procedures should be established according to individual organizational and operational contexts with the involvement of all relevant international and national/local staff.
- At the moment, issues related to 'safety', such as health threats and natural disasters, may not be the primary focus of this Guidebook, but it also draws attention to the matters associated to vehicle accidents, insurance and medical evacuation and the need of post-incident psychosocial support. It is important to remember that health and safety threats also pose significant threats to aid workers and organizations, and should take precautions accordingly.
- This Guidebook does not cover the security or protection of local populations, refugees and displaced persons, women and children, or other vulnerable persons.

- Most of all, this Guidebook is no guarantee of 'security'. Using this Guidebook does not replace the need for regular and inclusive planning, appropriate training, judgement based on experience, coupled with the relevant equipment and procedures, applied as each situation and operation requires.

## 4. Structure of This Guidebook

This Guidebook follows the examples of the Sphere Handbook, and is composed of several standards, relevant key actions, key indicators, and guidance notes.

- **Key Actions:** are suggested to attain the standard. Some actions may not be applicable in all contexts, and it is up to the organizations to select the relevant actions and devise alternative actions that will result in the standard being met.

- **Key Indicators:** serve as 'signals' that show whether a standard has been attained. They provide a way of measuring and communicating the processes and results of the key actions. The key indicators relate to the minimum standard, not to the key actions.

- **Guidance Notes:** include context-specific points to consider when aiming at reaching the key actions and key indicators. They provide knowledge, good practices, information and resources accumulated by the global humanitarian and development community. Further details and references are provided at the end of each chapter.

## 5. Labelling of Information

- Standards, Key Actions and Key Indicators are bordered.
- Guidance notes of particular importance are highlighted in blue.
- Information in Standard 2 that is of particular importance to those operating in conflict areas or high-risk areas are shaded.

## 6. How to Use This Guidebook

A) Senior Managers and Operational Managers of Organizations (Executive Board Members): It is strongly recommended to refer at least the following sections of this Guidebook in order to understand the general outline of security risk management including the duty of care.

   - Standard 1
   - Key Actions and Key Indicators for other standards (there are three Key Actions and Indicators in the Standard 2)
   - Sections that are highlighted in blue

B) Security Managers/Officers of Humanitarian Organizations: It is recommended to read through this Guidebook. For those organizations operating in conflict or high-risk areas, it is strongly encouraged to closely examine the sections that are shaded in Standard 2.

C) Security Managers/Officers of Development Organizations: When appropriate, refer the shaded sections in Standard 2 which are intended for organizations operating in conflict or high-risk areas, but otherwise it is recommended to read through the rest of this Guidebook.

D) For a quick overview of the Guidebook: It is recommended to refer the following sections.

- Key Actions and Key Indicators of each Standard (there are three Key Actions and Key Indicators in Standard 2)
- The 'Background'
- Sections highlighted in blue

E) Those who plan to conduct a 'Self-check' on their organization's Security Plans and Procedures, or those who plan to create Security Plans for their organizations:

Refer Guidance Notes and References in Standard 2 to assess the organization's security management, and take necessary measures and actions to improve the organization's security policies, procedures and plans.

It is highly recommended to compile reflections, measures and actions into a document and to share it with relevant parties. The critical part of this exercise lies in the process of planning and reviewing the security plan with the involvement of all relevant staff, and not the document itself that is produced by this exercise. Thus, the document should be kept simple and concise.

Organizations that do not have field offices and that operate on a mission-basis are recommended to take '2.3 Security Plan in the Field' into consideration when they are considering '2.2 Security Plan at Headquarters' and the security plan for partner organizations.

- "Safety and Security Policies", "Reference 2-I: Sample Outline of Safety and Security Policies"
- "Security Plan at Headquarters", "Reference 2-II: Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Headquarters"
- "Security Plan in the Field", "Reference 2-III: Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Field Posts"

## Background

### 1. Professionalization of Security Management in Humanitarian and Development Field

Looking back on the history of Japanese NGOs, the first wave of emergence took place in the early 1960s, when several organizations were founded aiming at addressing the social development needs in Asian countries, followed by the second wave when a number of existing organizations were established around 1979 as a result of the Indochina refugee crisis. [1] In the 30 years since their advent, Japanese NGOs have expanded their operational size, and are now working in various sectors not only in Asian countries but also in countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Quite a few NGOs do not limit themselves to working in development, but are proactively engaged in the humanitarian response both in natural and complex emergencies.

Regardless of whether working in a development context or a humanitarian context, expansion of operational size increases the chance of encountering various threats. According to the Humanitarian Outcomes report, the nature of the security environment has become much more complex since the 1990s. For 10 years between 2005 and 2015, the number of casualties of aid workers has been steadily increasing. Japanese staff are not immune to this trend. [2] Since the turn of the century, there have been reports of a number of cases in which Japanese staff have been kidnapped or abducted, taken hostage, or become victims of terrorism. Even excluding victims of security-related incidents, a number of aid workers have lost their lives due to contingent events such as road accidents and diseases.

Given the prevalence of security as well as safety related threats, what kind of security risks could NGOs face in their working environment? Take the threat of malaria as an example. Suppose that a Japanese staff managing a project in an area where malaria is endemic is infected by malaria and hospitalized in a dazed condition. As long as the organization took the decision to implement a project in such an area, it should have provided the staff with necessary measures to prevent malaria as well as all possible means to protect their life in case of infection. In the worst-case scenario of loss of life, the top management of the organization will inevitably have to explain the incident to the public.

As NGOs working in the field of international cooperation, we are responsible for ensuring the safety and security of all concerned staff and stakeholders. This means that if any person involved in our work – irrespective of whether an international staff or a national/local staff, or whether a direct employee or a beneficiary – becomes a victim of any type of incident, we are morally and legally obliged to take institutional action. If the organization does not properly respond to the incident, it may lead to serious consequences such as cessation of the project or, in the worst case, dissolution of the organization. We are therefore required to professionalize ourselves in term of security management.

[1] Japan NGO Center for International Cooperation (JANIC). (n.d.). *Understanding NGOs* [Japanese article]. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from www.janic.org/ngo/faq/.

[2] The Aid Worker Security Database. (n.d.), Major attacks on aid workers: Summary statistics. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from https://aidworkersecurity.org.

This chapter describes the threats that NGOs are facing, giving an overview of how the safety and security environment has changed over the decades since the emergence of Japanese NGOs, and describes the institutional responsibilities that organizations should take when working in high-risk environments, and concludes by stressing the importance of security management as an enabler for programmes and accountability.

## 2. A Brief History of Changes in the Security Environment

- 1960s to 1980s
  Japanese NGOs emerged in this period. While a nuclear war was the main security threat during the Cold War, the threat of ethnic or religious conflict was not so prevalent as nowadays. The major safety and security concerns for NGOs therefore were mainly those of ordinary crime, traffic accidents, and diseases.

- 1990s
  The end of the Cold War triggered the rise of political and religious radicalism as well as ethnic cleansing, which led to ethnic and religious conflicts worldwide. Along with the increase in humanitarian need in conflict affected areas, Japanese NGOs also began entering the field of humanitarian assistance, which required those working in the humanitarian arena to be well aware of the security concerns and to take necessary measures. Incidents directly targeting Japanese staff, however, were still rare during this period.

- 2000s
  The establishment of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) became a controversial issue, potentially increasing security threats to humanitarian workers particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq. Kidnappings and assaults directly targeting Japanese nationals frequently occurred between 2004 and 2008 in those countries. These incidents compelled humanitarian agencies to re-assess their own security measures. This period also became a turning point in that the government of Japan shifted its stance and restricted Japanese nationals from going to medium/high-risk areas.

- 2010s
  Protracted conflicts in the Middle East and Africa exacerbated the security environment. Japanese nationals continue to fall victim to kidnappings and assaults in countries such as Syria, Algeria and Bangladesh, giving Japanese humanitarian workers little space to operate in medium/high-risk areas. Widespread indiscriminate terrorism is another security concern; countries not affected by conflicts are no longer immune to terrorism. It requires those involved in development, whose mandate is not necessarily of a humanitarian nature, to raise their awareness of security management.

## 3. Safety & Security is an Enabler for Programmes

Each organization has its own respective mission and, in pursuit of it, we must continuously weigh the outcomes we aim to achieve against the risks we may face. We are able to provide assistance only when we judge that the expected outcome is larger than the risks we may face.

The worldwide deterioration of the security environment since the 1990s tilts the scales against the pursuit of our missions, meaning that the security risks are often higher than the outcomes we may expect. While security threats have increased significantly over the decades, humanitarian and development needs are also increasing more than ever before. In such circumstances, it is the NGO itself that should make the decision whether or not to go to a high-risk environment, and if it decides to go, the organization must be responsible for potential outcomes that may occur as a result of taking security risks. As a result, the governing bodies of the NGO (such as the Board of Directors) will bear the duty of care for their staff and operations.

While it may be true that we should avoid taking risks where possible, we should not give up pursuing our missions simply because there is a security risk. This is because it is the mission of NGOs to address the challenges underlying the security threats. Security Risk Management (SRM) is therefore essential in order to pursue our mission. SRM is a way to properly manage the risks rather than simply avoiding them, to minimize the negative effects, to establish an environment where we can operate, and to be accountable for ourselves. Facing the threats does not necessarily mean we have to avoid them; rather, we are required to manage them. The next chapters will introduce seven standards that enable organizations to operate in high-risk environments. These standards are not the goal per se, but are a means to the end.

**Column: Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)**

PRT is a military-civilian structure designed to operate in insecure environments such as post-conflict countries. It was initiated by the U.S. in post-Taliban Afghanistan in the early 2000s. A number of PRTs were formulated mainly by the NATO states and their command authority was delegated to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Under the command of the armed forces of the countries in charge, military units engage in security enforcement whereas civilian units provide aid assistance. As of July 2017, there are 26 PRTs led by 14 countries[3]. PRTs were also in operation from 2005 to 2011 in Iraq. While it has been said that PRTs improve security, support good governance, and enhance provincial development, criticisms also have been raised from civil society arguing that, because of the nature of military-oriented operation, there are concerns about the PRTs' efficiency, speciality and equity in delivering aid assistance. Civil societies too are concerned that security threats to humanitarian workers could increase as local people could mistake humanitarian workers for military-associated personnel.[4]

[3] USAID. (2018). *Provincial Reconstruction Teams.* Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from https://www.usaid.gov/provincial-reconstruction-teams.

[4] Kei'ichiro Tomita. (2007). Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) Operations in Afghanistan [Japanese article]. *Reference 2007-03*. Retrieved 21 March 2018 from http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/999764; Japan Afghan NGO Network (JANN). (2009). *On Civilian Assistance in Afghanistan Alternative to Japan's Refuelling Mission in the Indian Ocean* [Japanese article]. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from http://www.ngo-jvc.net/jp/notice/2010/data/20100219_afghanistan_lobby.pdf.

## Standard 1: Commitment to Safety and Security

*The management of signatory organizations commits to ensure the safety and security of its staff, volunteers, interns, and contractors in line with their duty of care and accepted international standards for safety and security.*

**Primary Responsibility**

Safety and security are not only an ethical and moral concern that may arise as a result of an individual's desire to engage in international cooperation, but are also an explicit legal obligation. This requires the recognition and acceptance of responsibility and accountability under the law, through a top-down approach driven by the organization's governing bodies. As a result, institutional policy should not be a condensed version of amalgamated field practices. Thus, the primary responsibility of representatives of the organization is to ensure the safety and security of its own staff members.

**Duty of Care**

Duty of care is an organizational obligation that has implications for SRM. The duty of care benchmark has risen significantly over the past decade, and what was once considered good enough would certainly not be considered adequate today. Although duty of care is a legal term for the responsibilities that organizations have towards their staff, there is also a moral obligation of duty of care that organizations should consider. As professionals engaged in humanitarian and development activities, duty of care to aid workers should not be undermined and indeed it should be complemented as far as possible.

**Accepted International Standards**

As humanitarian programmes expanded globally in the 1990s, there was a growing recognition of the need to improve professional standards, to enhance the effectiveness of interventions, and to ensure accountability within the humanitarian system as a whole. In response, major international standards on humanitarian work emerged such as Humanitarian Principles, Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief and Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS). They guide humanitarian action and their application is essential to distinguish humanitarian action from other forms of activities and action. There is a general consensus that compliance with these international standards enhances organizational safety and security in both humanitarian and development field.

**Key Actions:**

- Make sure that the governing body of the organization (e.g. Executive board, annual meeting) explicitly states and convey the organization's Duty of Care to all employees concerning safety and security in the workplace. (see explanations about Article 644 of the Civil Code in Guidance Notes 1, 2 (P12))
- Make sure that the governing bodies of the organization delegate responsibilities explicitly (e.g. to the chair of the board) to ensure legal and regulatory compliance concerning safety and security in the workplace. (see Guidance Note 3 (P12) and Reference 5-1 Example Structure and Responsibilities p. 60)

- Recognize widely-accepted international standards by the organization (e.g. Code of Conduct for IFRC and NGO, CHS). (see also Guidance Notes 4, 5, 6, 7 (P13-14))
- Make all employees aware of their legal rights and obligations concerning safety and security in the workplace. (see also Guidance Notes 1 (P12), 8 (P14), Standard 2.1 Guidance Notes 5 (P22), Standard 5 Guidance Notes 2 (P57))

**Key Indicators:**

- Responsibility for legal compliance is known throughout the organization and to other relevant stakeholders.
- Compliance with laws and regulations is reviewed in line with accepted international standards on a regular basis.
- If applicable to organizational mission and mandate, consider to become a signatory of accepted international standards.

**Guidance Notes:**

1. **Scope of Application:** National laws of the country in which NGOs are registered apply to organizations, associations, employers and employees. This includes national laws which address health and safety in the workplace. NGOs owe a legal responsibility to their employees to ensure a safe work environment, whatever and wherever that may be, and to take reasonable practical steps to protect them against any foreseeable risks. This responsibility is no less relevant to insecure field environments that often present context-specific risks and NGOs are subject to the same legal obligations and responsibilities as other organizations.

2. **Duty of Care:** The duty of care is a legal obligation imposed on an individual or organization requiring them to adhere to a standard of reasonable care while performing acts that present a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to others. Negligence is often defined as a failure to adhere to (or breach) a standard of reasonable care, resulting in both organizational and individual loss, damage and injury. The standard of reasonable care is typically assessed by reference to the actions of a person exercising reasonable care and skill in the same or similar circumstances. The standard of reasonable care will vary from country to country.
   NGOs owe legal obligations to ensure physical safety for employed staff as stipulated under Article 5 of the Labour Contract Act, "In association with a labour contract, an Employer is to give the necessary consideration to allow a Worker to work while ensuring the employee's physical safety." Employers are required to manage working time of staff appropriately, to provide medical check-up and subsequent actions as needed, and to establish a safety and health management system. This Guidebook mainly presents organizational duties and responsibilities which derive from the duty of care as an overarching concept to cover various types of contracts including those with board members, contract workers, secondment staff, interns and volunteers, along with staff employed outside of Japan.

3. **Civil Code Article 644:** In the Japanese context, the duty of care of an organization refers to "Duty of Care of Mandatory" in Article 644 of the Civil Code. The organization and the

governing bodies are in a relationship in which the responsibilities of the organization are delegated to the governing bodies by the organization. In accordance with Article 644, the governing bodies (referring to board directors, supervisors, auditors, etc.) to which the organizational responsibilities are delegated "shall assume a duty to administer the mandated business with the care of a good manager in compliance with the main purport of the mandate", i.e. duty of care. Therefore, the governing bodies, according to their position and ability, no matter whether they are paid or unpaid, whether full-time or part-time, are required to perform their authority and responsibilities with duty of care.

4. **Humanitarian Principles:** Underlining all humanitarian action are the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence. These principles, derived from international humanitarian law, have been taken up by the United Nations in General Assembly Resolutions 46/182 and 58/114. Their global recognition and relevance are furthermore underscored by the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief (Guidance Note 5) and the Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (Guidance Note 7), and are relevant to both humanitarian and development agencies. Because humanitarian action should be non-political, humanitarian and social, the organization is guided by humanitarian principles in its response to all humanitarian issues, whether caused by conflict, violence, natural disaster or poverty. The principle of "Do No Harm", for example, obliges an organization to prevent and mitigate any negative impact of its actions on affected populations. Humanitarian principles provide the basis for warring parties to accept humanitarian action in situations of armed conflict. It is important to ensure that organizational policies and operational decision-making on issues such as funding, beneficiaries, modes of operation, and security measures are in line with humanitarian principles.

5. **Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief:** The Code of Conduct sets out ten core principles as well as three annexes with recommendations to governments of affected states, donor governments and intergovernmental organizations. Over the years, adherence to the Code has become one important way for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (IFRC) and NGOs to define themselves as humanitarians. Since the development of the Code of Conduct, there have been many developments in terms of standards and mechanisms to improve the quality and accountability of humanitarian response. However, the Code of Conduct remains a central reference in the sector. The IFRC keeps a public listing of all the humanitarian organizations that become signatories of the Code on its website and new signatories are welcome to register at any time. The IFRC neither vets new signatories nor monitors their compliance. However, in order to be listed on this site as a signatory, each organization must: (1) affirm that it is a humanitarian organization; (2) provide and update all requested contact details, including its website address; and (3) submit its request through the head of the organization. Registration is accepted through the IFRC website.

6. **InterAction's Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS):** Reflecting the operational environment of NGOs and the rise of serious incidents such as killings, kidnappings, and attacks that cause serious injuries, as well as politically-motivated

attacks against humanitarian workers, InterAction, which is the largest alliance of U.S.-based international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who focus on disaster relief and sustainable development programmes, has established a Security Unit to help members develop appropriate responses. In this context, InterAction's MOSS was developed to assist InterAction's members to develop their own security management system in incorporating MOSS in their respective institutional approaches to security. Recognizing that every organization will have differing needs, the "Suggested Guidance" section for each standard below represents points to consider, rather than requirements, for implementing InterActions' Security Standards. Not every point is necessarily appropriate for every organization or for every situation. MOSS-introduced systematic approaches to NGOs' risk management and those security risk management systems have become the industry standard, which many of InterAction's members follow. JaNISS referred to InterAction's MOSS when developing its own NGO Standards for Safety and Security and this guidebook with technical cooperation from InterAction's Security Unit.

7. **Core Humanitarian Standard (CHS)**: The Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability (CHS) sets out Nine Commitments that organizations and individuals involved in humanitarian response can use to improve the quality and effectiveness of the assistance they provide. It also facilitates greater accountability to communities and people affected by crisis: knowing what humanitarian organizations have committed to will enable them to hold those organizations to account. The CHS places communities and people affected by crisis at the centre of humanitarian action and promotes respect for their fundamental human rights. It is underpinned by the right to life with dignity, and the right to protection and security as set forth in international law, including within the International Bill of Human Rights. As a core standard, the CHS describes the essential elements of principled, accountable and high-quality humanitarian action. Humanitarian organizations may use it as a voluntary code with which to align their own internal procedures. It can also be used as a basis for verification of performance, for which a specific framework and associated indicators have been developed to ensure relevance to different contexts and types of organization.

8. **Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and Safeguarding Measures and Standards**: In areas affected by conflict and natural disasters, risks of sexual exploitation and abuse, domestic violence, child marriage, abuse against vulnerable people, and Gender-Based-Violence (GBV) are increased. It is important for NGOs to recognize these risks and take necessary preventive measures to protect staff and beneficiaries. Sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations peacekeeping forces come to international attention in the 1990s. In 2000, the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 was adopted, highlighting the gender dynamics of armed conflicts and emergencies and stressing the need to protect vulnerable populations from sexual and gender-based violence. In 2003, the UN secretary-general issued a bulletin outlining a zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse applicable to all UN staff, and the responsibilities of mission leadership to implement accountability, including through referral of cases to national bodies for criminal prosecution. In the NGO sector, sexual misconduct by a senior manager working in earthquake-hit Haiti in 2010 came to light in 2018, leading to sweeping calls for the promotion of an environment that keeps people safe.

A number of safeguarding policies and guidelines have been adopted to date by international organizations including the following:

**Minimum Operating Standards; protection from sexual exploitation and abuse by own personnel**

To provide protection from sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) by own personnel, the compliance with a set of Minimum Operating Standards for PSEA (MOS- PSEA) is required. The MOS-PSEA were developed by Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), modelling after the Minimum Operating Security Standards for Staff Safety (MOSS) compliance mechanism, which is mandatory for the UN System to ensure there is a common set of requirements that all agencies follow in order to ensure staff safety. The key elements of the MOS-PSEA are: management and coordination, engagement with and support of local community population, prevention, and response.

**PSEA Implementation Quick Reference Handbook**

This Handbook provides a quick reference guide to measures for protection from sexual exploitations and abuse and sexual harassment (PSEAH) in an organization or project. Each chapter includes a case study sharing how specific organizations tackled this important work. The guidelines can be used by organizations which are just beginning to put PSEAH measures in place. It can also be used by more experienced organizations to check that their PSEAH work fully reflects current good practice. The original PSEA handbook was updated in October 2020 to include sexual harassment.

**Safeguarding children and young people**

A group of Japanese NGOs developed this guidebook in 2020, with the aim of promoting safeguarding measures among these organizations and beyond. Eleven standards are presented to protect children and young people from various risks including exploitation and abuse in NGO projects. Regular self-assessment is also recommended.

**Column 1: Case Law on Duty of Care (Dennis vs Norwegian Refugee Council)**

On 29 June 2012, Steve Dennis, an employee of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), was injured and kidnapped, along with three other colleagues, following an attack during a VIP visit to the IFO II refugee camp in Dadaab, Kenya. Four days later the hostages were set free during an armed rescue operation carried out by Kenyan authorities and local militia. Three years later, Dennis submitted a claim at the Oslo District Court against his former employer, the NRC, for compensation for economic and non-economic loss following the kidnapping. With a focus on determining negligence in relation to the incident, the Court considered and reached conclusions on the following: the foreseeability of risk, mitigating measures to reduce and avert risk, gross negligence, causation and loss.

The Court found that the risk of kidnapping was foreseeable. It also found that the NRC could have implemented mitigating measures to reduce and avert the risk of kidnapping. The Court furthermore found that the NRC acted with gross negligence and that the NRC's negligent conduct was a necessary condition for the kidnapping to have occurred. In summary, the Court found that the legal requirements for compensation for injury, as well as compensation

for pain and suffering were met. The Court ordered the NRC to pay Dennis approximately 4.4 million Norwegian Krone (approximately 465,000 euros (60 million yen)).

Although the terminology and approach used by the Court differ from a standard SRM approach, the ruling refers to elements familiar to security experts and uses some of the evidence of failings in these areas to find that the NRC fell short of meeting due care standards in this instance. For example, in terms of context and risk analyses, the Court found that there was an insufficient understanding of the security situation in Dadaab by the NRC decision-makers, which resulted in the risk of kidnapping not being properly analysed shortly before the VIP visit. The Court also found weaknesses with regards to the identification and implementation of mitigating measures, particularly in relation to the decision to not use an armed escort, which was contrary to existing practice and security recommendations for Dadaab at the time.

The fundamental conclusion that can be drawn from the court case is that duty of care is a legal obligation that organizations in the international aid sector must adhere to and that they must do so to the same standard as any other employer. The ruling does not argue, despite the context, that operating in Dadaab was contrary to the law. The case instead highlights that mitigating measures must be proportionate to the risk. Therefore, the ruling should not cause organizations to become more risk averse but rather cause them to institute stronger SRM procedures in line with the context they are operating in. The ruling furthermore highlights that an essential component of duty of care in high-risk environments is 'informed consent'. The Court found that informed consent was doubtful or entirely absent in some instances leading up to the incident.

The case was covered widely in mainstream media and discussed at length by aid workers and organizations in different forums and analytical reports. It was described as: a 'landmark case', 'precedent-setting', a 'game-changer', and a 'wake-up call' for the aid industry, with significant remarks on duty of care.

**Column 2: Insurance against risks**

NGOs are encouraged to take actions to minimize any risks by carrying out risk assessments. One option to minimize risk is to have an insurance policy. It is crucial for the organization's management team to consider the balance between risk management and affordability, as the general rule is that the higher the associated risk is, the more expensive the cost is. Several types of insurance policies are shown below:

1. Employer's liability insurance

Employers' liability insurance can pay the compensation amount and legal costs if an employee claims compensation for a work-related illness or injury. Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co., Ltd. offers this insurance policy for charities, NGOs, and individual business owners. It also provides a policy called 'Super T Protection', in combination with the following three policies.

2. Non-statutory compensation insurance

If an employee claims compensation for a work-related illness or injury, and the amount to be paid exceeds a statutory amount, this insurance policy can pay the compensation amount.

3. Directors and officers liability insurance (D&O)

Directors and officers (D&O) liability insurance is intended to protect individuals from personal losses if they are sued as a result of serving as a director or an officer of an organization. It can also cover the legal fees and other costs the organization may incur as a result of such a suit. MS & AD Holdings, Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co., Ltd., and others offer such insurance policies. NGOs with the public corporation status are entitled to buy this policy at a reduced price from Sompo Japan through a group insurance system by Japan Association of Charitable Organizations (JACO).

4. Employment practices liability coverage

This insurance provides coverage to employers against claims made by employees alleging employment-related issues such as wrongful termination of contract and various types of harassment.

As to overseas travel insurance, see Standard 4, Column 2 (p. 54).

**References**


- Irish Aid. (2013). *Irish Aid Guidelines for NGO Professional Safety and Security Risk Management*.
- Shaun Bickley. (2017). *Security Risk Management: A Basic Guide for Smaller NGOs*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF).
- Maarten Merkelbach and Edward Kemp. (2016). *Duty of Care: A review of the Dennis v Norwegian Refugee Council ruling and its implications*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF).
- Kelsey Hoppe and Christine Williamson. (2016). *Dennis vs Norwegian Refugee Council: Implications for Duty of Care*. Humanitarian Practise Network (HPN).

## Standard 2: Organizational Safety and Security Policies and Plans

*Signatories shall have an organization safety and security policies in accordance to the organization's mission, mandate, values and risk tolerance at headquarters' level, and security plans at both the headquarters and field levels based on a participatory security risk assessment and analysis.*

Standard 2 states that organizations shall have: (1) **safety and security policies** and (2) **security plans** at both headquarters and field levels. Safety and security policies are protocols that guide all the agency's security decisions. Security plan at the headquarters level defines the relationship between the headquarters and field operations as well as security procedures at the headquarters, and country-specific security plans are tailored to respond to a specific context to the location. This is shown in the figure below.



## 2.1. Safety and Security Policies

**Safety and security policies** apply to the entire organization. These policies will reflect the organization's unique mission, mandate, commitments, mode of operation and risk tolerance. They should clearly articulate the expectations the organization has of its employees and the organization's responsibility to its employees, including redress in the event the organization or its employees fail to adhere to security policies.

**Key Actions:**

- The safety and security policy clearly defines organizational scope of safety and security, mission, principles, roles of the organization's management team, and organization' responsibilities for its staff. (see also Guidance Notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 (P19-25), and Reference 2-I: Sample Outline of Safety and Security Policies (P28))
- The safety and security policy clearly states the organization's risk management objectives and the rationale for managing security risks that are based on the security risk assessment, linking with organization's risk tolerance, mandate, and commitments. (see also Guidance Notes 2 and 4 (P20, 21))
- A mechanism is established to redress, remedy, and take disciplinary measures in the event that the organization or its employees fail to adhere to the safety and security policies. (see also the section 'Failure to follow safety and security policies' in Guidance Notes 5 "Organization's Security Principles" (P22), and Guidance Notes 6 "Legal obligations related to staff safety" (P25))
- The safety and security policy, including the above key actions, and taking account of Guidance Notes 5 and the key issues shown in Reference 2-1 (P28) are documented and are understood by all staff members including those in headquarters and field locations. (see also Guidance Note 5 (P22))

**Key Indicators:**

- The organization's safety and security policies include a value statement relating to safety and security of the organization's staff, and a clear operational link between this value statement and security related Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) at the field level.
- Both the management and staff (including employees, volunteers, interns, contractors and others) understand their obligation to comply with the organization's safety and security policies and procedures.
- Regular reviews of safety and security policies and procedures are conducted with the participation of all relevant staff.

**Guidance Notes:**

1. **Definition of Safety and Security**: 'Safety' refers to 'freedom from risk or harm as a result of unintentional acts, such as accidents, natural phenomena or illness' whereas 'security'

refers to 'freedom from risk or harm resulting from violence or other intentional acts'.[5] While ensuring the security of staff, assets and programmes against assault, abduction, robbery, terrorism or sabotage necessarily requires the investment of considerable time and resources, it is important to remember that safety threats such as vehicle accidents, malaria, water-borne diseases, HIV and other health threats, mental health, natural disasters such as floods and earthquakes, and pandemic outbreaks of infectious diseases also pose significant threats to aid workers (see Column 1 below about pandemics).

2. **Organization's Mission, Mandate and Values**: It is important for the organization's managers to understand that each organization needs to determine its risk tolerance for its staff in the field according to its mission, mandate and values. The vulnerabilities of NGOs significantly vary with their overarching mandate and field operations. For example, those organizations working for human rights protection and those for development may face different security risks, and those organizations working for life-saving activities has an ethical obligation to withstand higher level of security risk than an organization involved in livelihood projects.

   Each NGO has its own unique mission, mandate, and principles and operates in context-specific environments, which is to say that all NGOs should develop their risk tolerance frameworks reflecting their purposes and missions. Based on risk tolerance frameworks, NGOs need to develop their own safety and security policies and plans. It is also important that all employees understand that risk tolerance is determined according to the organization's purpose and mission, and hence it should be part of safety and security policies.

3. **Security Strategies (Acceptance, Protection and Deterrence)**: The organization's safety and security policies should state which security strategy is adopted in general contexts and in specific contexts respectively. There are typically three security strategies used by humanitarian agencies in all contexts.

   - **Acceptance**: Building a safe operating environment through consent, approval and cooperation from individuals, communities and local authorities.
   - **Protection**: Reducing the risk, but not the threat, by reducing the vulnerability of the organization, typically by increasing physical protection of buildings, compounds, and/or distribution sites.
   - **Deterrence**: Reducing the risk by containing the threat with a counter threat, such as armed protection, diplomatic and political leverage, and temporary suspension.

   Given their mission and values, humanitarian agencies find that a far more appealing security strategy is acceptance: acceptance can and should be the foundation for all security strategies.[6] In reality, the acceptance approach is usually not enough on its own, and humanitarian agencies need at least some protection even when there is wide local

[5] Overseas Development Institute. (2010). *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, Good Practice Review Number 8 (New Edition)*. Humanitarian Practice Network [hereafter GPR8 (2010)], London: Overseas Development Institute, p.xvii.

[6] GPR8 (2010), p.56.

support. Deterrence is usually adopted as the last resort when acceptance and protection have not been successful or have proven inadequate, but the range of measures is very limited for humanitarian agencies.

In practice, a good security strategy is devised by combining the above-mentioned approaches in a flexible manner. The point is that security management should be proactive, involving conscious choices about the mix of approaches pursued in the light of the threats identified, and the approaches other agencies are taking. It is also important to remember that different approaches have different resource implications.

**References**


- Overseas Development Institute (2010), *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments, Good Practice Review Number 8 (New Edition)* [hereafter GPR8 (2010)]. Humanitarian Practice Network, Chapter 3 Security Strategy
- James Davis. (2015), *Security to Go: A Risk Management Toolkit for Humanitarian Aid Agencies*, *Module 4 Security Strategies: Acceptance Protection and Deterrence* [hereafter, EISF (2015)]
- European Commission's Directorate-General for Humanitarian Aid (ECHO). (2004). *Generic Security Guide for Humanitarian Organizations* [hereafter ECHO (2004)], Section 2.3 Approaches to Security
- Mercy Corps. (2011), *Field Security Manual (March 2011).* The Security Triangle


4. **Security Risk Assessment (SRA): Definition of a framework for determining an acceptable threshold of risk to staff, assets, and reputation of the organization**

Proper assessment of risk is a critical component of good safety and security management. SRAs are at the core of any security plan. Every security plan should identify threats and address them through appropriate risk mitigation measures and contingency plans, based upon an appropriate SRA (see also Mitigation Measure in 2.3 Security Plan in the Field). Contemporary thinking on good practice holds that organizations should conduct a SRA before starting operations in a new location, and that this should inform programme design from the very beginning.

The objective of conducting a risk assessment is to help determine the level of risk in undertaking a programme, and weigh this risk against the benefits the programme brings to the beneficiaries. In this context, the SRA process should be considered as a central part of the project design since exposure to risk and mitigation measures are both linked to programme objectives and implementation.

The SRA can cover a broad range of threats including violence, conflict, natural disasters, terrorism, health issues, political interference, crime and corruption. The SRA should include context and programme analysis, threat and vulnerability assessment, and risk analysis (impacts, likelihood, and mitigation measures and risk threshold).

The SRA is not something to be completed and put on the shelf, but should be treated as a living document that is frequently revisited and revised as the situation changes. The SRA should be inclusive, drawing perspectives and information from all staff, in order to

create a common understanding of the risk and a sense of shared responsibility for the necessary security measures.

**References**


- GPR8. (2010). Chapter 2. Risk Assessment
- EISF. (2015). Module 3. Risk Assessment Tool
- ECHO. (2004). Section 2. Introduction to Security


5. **Organization's Security Principles**: The following principles underlying safety and security of the organization's staff can be included in the organization's safety and security policies. They are extracts from safety and security policies of various humanitarian organizations, and are not exhaustive. The organization should select and adopt those principles in its safety and security policies according to its mission, mandate and mode of operation.

   - **Safety and Security Policy Scope**: To whom the policy is applied. A general consensus should be reached in advance as to whom the policy should be applied: international/local staff, immediate family members of expatriate and national/local staff, local volunteers, contract staff from other NGOs, local government staff, consultants, interns, and/or visitors. Since every member of the organization has a collective responsibility for their own and team's security, a strong sense of ownership of safety and security policies should be shared by people at every level of the organization, from the Executive Director/CEO to the Country Representative, to locally hired drivers and volunteers. It is also important to remember that every member is expected to behave as a representative of his/her organization. As to application of safety and security policies for study tour programme participants, see Column 1 below.
   - **Responsibility for Security Management**: Statement on the operational responsibility for the security of staff[7] following the line management structure – organizational, headquarters, regional, country and day-to-day management. (see also Standard 5: Accountability).
   - **Responsibility for Safety and Security Policies**: Statement on who will develop the organization's safety and security policies, monitor implementation of policies, and give permission for exemption. (see also Standard 5: Accountability)
   - **Security Risk Management (SRM) Plan**: A document which communicates issues concerning how the organization's security risk management plan should be developed for each country/operation. Such SRM plan should include an operational context and risk analysis (including threats and vulnerability assessment), and procedures for review and approval. (see also Standard 5: Accountability)
   - **Primacy of Life**: Organizations place maximum priority on human life over organization's physical assets such as facilities, vehicles, aid supply and materials.

[7] In this guidebook, the term 'staff' means all the persons involved in any organization's activities regardless of whether paid or unpaid, full-time or part-time, specialists or consultants, temporarily transferred employees, interns and volunteers.

- **Humanitarian Principles**: The organization's position on the core humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and operational independence.[8] Its position on the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief could be added as well.
- **Protection against Sexual Exploitation and Abuse**: The organization's measures to protect its beneficiaries from sexual exploitation and abuse, including the implementation of codes of conduct, training of the staff, and the establishment of complaints mechanisms and investigation procedures.[9] (see also Standard 1 Guidance Note 8: Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and Safeguarding Measures and Standards, p. 14)
- **Risk tolerance**: Definition of the organization's threshold of acceptable risk to staff, assets and reputation of the organization, the point beyond which the risk is considered too high to continue operating. This may differ depending on the potential benefits of having a presence and a programme, and on the mandate of the organization.[10]
- **Individual and Organizational Responsibility**: The organization's duty of care for safety and security of employees and others who agree to adhere to the safety and security policies, procedures and instructions. Furthermore, all those who have agreed to adhere to the policies are expected to accept individual responsibility, on or off duty, for their personal security as well as the security of other colleagues, programmes and the organization. (see also Standard 1: Commitment to Safety and Security)
- **Failure to Follow Safety and Security Guidelines**: Statement on disciplinary action, including dismissal, against staff who do not follow safety and security guidelines or whose professional and personal behaviour puts themselves or others at risk while deployed in the field.
- **Comprehensive Security Planning with Field-level Perspectives**: It is recommended that each country office develop a local security management plan that reflects the organization's global mandate and programme objectives in the country. The plan should be flexible enough to allow local realities to be addressed, and the process should be inclusive involving the national/local staff. Procedures for approval, monitoring, and review/update should be specified. All staff must be made aware of its contents [11], practical application and authority of the security plan. (see also Standard 2.2: Security Plan at Headquarters, Guidance Note 1)
- **Full Participation of National/Local Staff in Security Planning**: Statement on how national/local staff should be involved in the formulation, review and implementation

[8] The first three principles were adopted in the General Assembly Resolution 46/182, *Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations*, A/RES/46/182 (19 December 1991), available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/46/182. The fourth principle was added in the General Assembly Resolution 58/114, A/RES/58/114 (5 February 2004), available from http://undocs.org/A/RES/58/114.

[9] For more details, see CHA Alliance (n.d.). *Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA).* Retrieved 21 March 2018 from https://www.chsalliance.org/what-we-do/psea; and Corinne Davey and Lucy Heaven Taylor (2017), *PSEA Implementation Quick Reference Handbook*. Retrieved 21 March 2018 from https://www.chsalliance.org/what-we-do/psea/psea-handbook.

[10] See GPR8 (2010), Chapter 2 Risk Assessment.

of safety and security policies and plans. National/local staff, and local partner organizations as appropriate, should be included in security preparedness, training and human resources management procedures. (see also Guidance Note 5)

- **Coordination and Information Sharing**: Statement on the organization's position on coordination with humanitarian and other agencies in managing security, especially on sharing security incident reports, and participation in regular mechanisms for sharing information. (see also Standard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors). Statement on a policy regarding the staff engagement to the press or government authorities including police and military. (see also Standard 2.3: Security Plan at Field Guidance Note 7)
- **Personal Property**: Statement on who will be responsible for the personal property of the organization's staff.
- **Capacity-Building of Staff**: Statement on the organization's commitment to ensure that all staff have the skills and capacity to analyse the security threats in their working environment and to reduce their vulnerability to these threats. (see also Standard 4: Human Resources Management)
- **Gender, Ethnicity and Nationality**: Statement on how the organization should deal with risks associated with specific gender, ethnicity and/or nationality at various levels. It also includes alternative and/or additional measures for its staff who potentially face particular risks. (see also Standard 4: Human Resources Management)
- **Requirement for Security Incident and Situation Reporting**: Statement on the requirement for the organization's staff to report security incidents, including threats and near-misses, to the field office and headquarters in order to enable tracking, monitoring and analysis of security trends, and to inform security risk assessments (SRA) and decision-making.[12]
- **Respect for Local Laws and Customs**: Statement on the organization's position on dealing with local laws and customs, especially where local laws conflict with international law or widely held ethical standards.
- **Bribes, Incentives and Gifts**: Statement on the organization's position on offering rewards, incentives, or bribes to local officials or people outside of the organization to carry out their daily tasks or to perform illegal services; and on the acceptance of a gift or other benefits by providing services and fulfilling duties.
- **Kidnap and Abduction**: Statement on the organization's response to kidnapping and abduction, position on ransoms for the release of kidnapped staff, support to immediate family, and post-incident support to the kidnapped staff.[13] (see also Standard 2.3: Security Plan in the Field, Guidance Note 14)
- **Right to Withdrawal**: Statement on the right of staff (and family members) to decline to enter high-risk environments or to withdraw from such an area, irrespective of the judgement of the line manager or organization on the risk in a particular situation, without impacting employment or suffering disciplinary action, and consecutive operational and human resource review processes at both local and headquarters levels.

[13] See GPR8 (2010), Chapter 14 Kidnapping and Hostage Situation.

- **Order to Withdrawal and Return**: Statement on the organization's right to withdraw its staff from situations that it considers to be dangerous, obligation of staff to obey such instructions, and line of authority to decide the withdrawal from and return to a programme area and country. (see also Standard 2.3: Security Plan in the Field, Guidance Note 12)
- **Evacuation**: Statement on the extent of the organization's responsibility to evacuate its staff according to the types of contracts such as international or national/local, along with their family members. (see also Standard 2.3: Security Plan in the Field, Guidance Note 13)
- **The Use of Armed Protection**: Statement on the organization's baseline position on the use of armed protection, and procedure for approving the use or hire of armed personnel in ad hoc and extreme situations. The statement may also cover the organization's position on staff carrying arms while on duty and firearms in the organization's vehicles.
- **Relationship with the Armed Forces**: Statement on the organization's position on engagement (including information sharing) with military forces, such as national, multinational and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. (see also Column 3, below.)

6. **Organization's legal rights and responsibilities for staff safety**: Organization's staff is entitled to require of the organization to implement duty of care. They are also entitled to exercise their rights which are recognized in organization's rules and regulations. Having adequate insurance, receiving a complete briefing on and training in security management, and being informed on evacuation plans are examples. Employee also have responsibilities towards the organization by respecting and adhering to organization's security management policies which are specified in its regulations, contracts, and TOR. They are also responsible for fulfilling roles and duties designated in security and safety management plans and other tasks ordered by their managers. Most organizations would expect that their staff will be involved in office security and responses to emergencies and disasters. The staff is also responsible for their own health. In some cases, roles specified in the risk management plans are considered equivalent to their responsibilities.

**Column 1: Response to outbreak of infectious diseases and pandemic**

Infectious diseases have wreaked havoc on human communities since ancient times. Since the 2000s, increasingly frequent epidemics have been observed, coincided with globalization, urbanization and climate change. We have seen Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), which originated in southern China in November 2002, reached Hong Kong in February 2003 and spread rapidly thereafter to 29 countries/regions on five continents. An outbreak of Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS) in 2012, and the Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa in 2014 are other examples. As of July 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic is an ongoing global pandemic of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS CoV-2). Its impact has been broad, affecting general society, economy, politics, and other areas.

We have all faced disruption, change and uncertainty during the COVID-19 outbreak, and this looks set to continue for a while. Hence it is not possible to provide any definitive recommendation on how NGOs should respond to this situation. Nevertheless, we can draw

some general lessons from this experience. It has been reconfirmed that it is imperative for humanitarian agencies to carry out risk assessment and to develop Critical Incident Management Plans (CIMP) in advance. This enables us to take actions in a flexible way with various scenarios so that we can continue our work and accomplish our missions even in extraordinary circumstances. At the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, medical services were severely stretched in many countries. At the same time, travel restrictions were placed both within and between countries. In some cases, programme continuity could be broken. It is very difficult to offer predictions on when the current pandemic will end. It is likely that the disease could return after some time and another pandemic or an isolated outburst of epidemics will take place in the future. Hence it is important for humanitarian organizations to assess various risks associated with evolution of the current pandemic and enhance their risk management plans with the assumption that the current pandemic will not be the last.

The following references by WHO and others are recommended:

**World Health Organization（WHO）**
Coronavirus disease(COVID-19) pandemic
https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019
（in Japanese）
https://extranet.who.int/kobe_centre/ja/news/COVID19_specialpage
Clinical care of severe acute respiratory infections – Tool kit
https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/clinical-care-of-severe-acute-respiratory-infections-tool-kit

**The Sphere Standards and the Coronavirus response**
https://spherestandards.org/coronavirus/

**Column 2: Study tour programmes and safety management policies**
Security and safety policies of those organizations which carry out study tours can be applied to the participants. Nevertheless, some specific considerations for the participants are required, differentiating them from the organization's employees. In Japan, organizations need to gain travel industry licences to conduct study tours. If the organization collaborates with a travel company, it is important to clarify roles to be played by respective parties including the company, the humanitarian organization, and the participants. It is also important to provide information concerning risks and threats, give opportunities to prepare as team members, and agree on rules in advance with the participants. It would be useful to create opportunities for peer-learning among organizations and travel companies which have carried our study tours and experienced security- and safety-related incidences. In this way, both organizations and participants can prepare adequately and raise awareness of the importance of safety and security.

**Column 3: Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination**
Since the 1990s, guidelines for civil and military coordination have been developed in collaboration between the United Nations and NGOs. This is a sensitive area, as there is a likelihood for NGOs to increase risks by collaborating military actors. Humanitarian organizations' use of military assets and their coordination with the military should focus on

improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the combined efforts. More details are found in the following reference:

https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/product-categories/use-military-and-civil-defense-assets

**References**


- InterAction. (2015). *InterAction Minimum Operating Security Standards*
- Mercy Corps. (2010). *Field Security Manual (March 2011)*
- Concern Worldwide. (2016). *Concern's Security Policy (March 2016)*
- Care International. (2008). *Care International Safety and Security Principles*
- Care International. (2013). *Care International Safety and Security Standards*
- Irish Aid. (2013). *Irish Aid Guidelines for NGO Professional Safety and Security Risk Management*
- People in Aid. (2008). *Policy Guide and Template: Safety and Security (Revised)*
- Lutheran World Federation. (2016). *LWF Safety and Security Policy (March 2016)*

## Reference 2-I: Sample Outline of Safety and Security Policy

### I. Introduction

- Purpose of safety and security policy
- Organization's statement on the importance of staff safety and security
- Organization's legal and moral obligation to manage workplace hazards and reduce the risk of harm to employees (duty of care)
- Development of safety and security policy and identification of focal points
- People who are aimed at by the policy
- Organization's definition of safety and security

### II. Organization's Mission and Values

- Rationale behind the inclusion of mission and value in safety and security policy
- Mission statement
- Organizational Values

### III. Organization's Risk Management Strategies

- Three basic security approaches: acceptance, protection and deterrence
- Organization's approach to Security Risk Management (SRM)

### IV. Organization's Security Principles

- Explanation of the organizational culture behind security arrangements, security risk tolerance and the key security principles that shape the organization's approach to safety and security of staff, including the roles, responsibilities, redress in the event of non-compliance and organizational structures.
- See 2.1. Safety and Security Policies Guidance Note 3 "Organization's Security Principles" for the list of key principles.

### V. Monitoring and Review Process

- Timing and the scope of safety and security policy review
- The responsibility for initiating and conducting the review and approving the reviewed safety and security policies
- Ensuring consultation and participation in the review process

## 2.2. Security Plan at Headquarters

**Security Plan at Headquarters**: An organization is responsible for ensuring security for all the staff and also for field operations. While a safety and security plan at the field level should be tailored to the specific location's context, a safety and security plan at the headquarters sets out the relationship between the headquarters and field locations as well as security procedures at the headquarters.

If your organization is a member of international federation or confederation, your interpretations of 'headquarters' may differ from those of Japanese NGOs.

Some organizations do not operate field office. Instead, the headquarter-level staff travels to the field as necessary. Such organizations should adopt relevant part of the key actions and guidance notes in this section, and the following section 2.3., as appropriate.

**Key Actions:**

- Clarify the relationship between the headquarters and field locations and their respective responsibilities. Operational security procedures at the headquarters and those between the headquarters and field locations should be clearly defined. (see also Guidance Note 1 and 2 (P30))
- Based on the headquarters' responsibilities to be clarified in the above, measures and procedures concerning risk assessment and safety and security plan development at the headquarters level are clearly defined (see also Guidance Notes 1, 2, 3, 4 (P30-31), and Reference 2-II regarding the key issues to be considered in the safety and security plan for headquarters (P34))
- A mechanism to report situations and all accidents and incidents, with clear scope, line, frequency and format, is established. (see also Guidance Note 4 (P31))
- A Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP) at headquarters is fully developed. (Guidance Notes 5 (P31))
- A safety and security plan at headquarters is fully developed, with reference to "Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Headquarters" (see also Standard 5 Guidance Notes 2 (P57))
- Conduct periodic reviews of the safety and security plan and reflection exercise after incidence with participation of all relevant staff members. The safety security plan should be updated incorporating any lessons learnt. (see also Guidance Notes 3 (P30))

**Key Indicators:**

- The safety and security plan at headquarters is developed, reflecting the key actions above, and it is fully disseminated among all the staff at headquarters and local offices.
- Regular safety and security exercises and drills are carried out, based on the safety and security plan.

**Guidance Notes:**

1. **Clarification of relationship between the headquarters and field locations with respective responsibilities. Headquarters' actions and procedures according to its responsibilities:**
   It is vital that the relationship between the headquarters and field locations is clearly defined with respective responsibilities. Confusion and conflicts of responsibilities might cause a security risk even though both sides are making efforts to respond to the original security risk. In most cases, as security risk assessment and security planning based on security risk assessment are pre-conditions for taking daily security measures and delegating responsibilities for such measures to field locations, both headquarters and field locations should cooperate with each other in making such assessment and planning. In most cases, responsibilities for daily security measures can be delegated to field locations as they have a better knowledge of the situation and so can make better decisions more quickly. On the other hand, the headquarters should be also responsible for intervening in field security measures if field locations may have made or be about to make errors or mistakes. The headquarters are usually also responsible for project operations, which itself affect security and security management at field locations, monitoring and evaluation of security and security management, as well as organizational decisions such as critical incident management, in close consultation with field locations. There are also organizations which do not have field offices or Japanese staff members based in the field. In such cases, the headquarters might be more responsible for security measures than in cases where there are field offices or Japanese staff members based in the field.
   In all cases, both sides should make efforts to build confidence in each other through good communication as well as the exchange of human and financial resources.
   In addition to clarifying the extent of responsibilities, it is also necessary to describe security risk assessment, security planning and measures and procedures to be taken according to the clarified responsibilities of the headquarters.

2. **Operational security procedures at headquarters and those between headquarters and field locations:** These procedures are necessary in order for headquarters and field locations to fulfil respective responsibilities indicated above. They include the key actions illustrated below.

   - Identification and appointment of security focal points at headquarters (see also Standard 5 Accountability);
   - Human and financial resource management (see also Standard 3 Resources);
   - Reporting and communication lines at headquarters and between the headquarters and field locations;
   - Operational security procedures between headquarters and field locations, based on the security management plan in the field.

**3. Security Risk Assessment (SRA):**
In developing security plans at headquarters, harm to the organization's staff, property or its reputation, as well as its vulnerabilities need to be assessed against possible prevention and mitigation measures. Once prevention and mitigation measures are identified, it is likely there will still be some residual risk, which should be checked against organizational risk threshold. As to threats in the field, mitigation measures should be

proposed based on the in-country risk assessment and consequent risk management plan. As to risk or harm at headquarters (e.g. crime, disasters, threat to domestic programmes, data breaches, negative impact on reputation, operational problems), managers at headquarters need to conduct assessment and to decide risk tolerance.

The risk assessment process should involve all staff members. They should first identify all security threats and vulnerabilities within a given context, and discuss potential measures. This process will enable participating staff members to raise their awareness of security management and share the level of awareness. It depends on the size of the organization and the security management plan, but in general staff representing organizational management, safety and security focal points, and those members who engaged with crisis incidents, if there have been any such incidents, should all participate in the process.

4. **Situation and incident reporting procedures (including the type of incidents to be reported, reporting line, frequency and formats):** Information is vital to take necessary and appropriate security measures, and so the headquarters needs to receive information from field locations on time. In order to receive information of sufficient quality and quantity and to follow the situation regularly and promptly, there should be reporting procedures for individual incidents (type of incidents to be reported, reporting line, frequency and formats to be included), in addition to regular reporting.

5. **Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP):** An organization might face serious incidents such as:

   - Death or serious injury of a staff member
   - Forceful Forced suspension of activities
   - Serious security deterioration or disasters that directly affect operation
   - Outbreak of infectious disease or pandemic
   - Major change such as relocation or evacuation
   - Communications disruption
   - Serious fraud
   - Compensation claims against the organization arising out of a security incident
   - Any incident which may attracts media interests
   - Bombing or other armed attack
   - Hostage-taking incident
   - Kidnapping and ransom demand

   In case of any critical incident, headquarters must make an organizational response to the situation based on the organization's Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP), in coordination with all the relevant sections, officers and staff members at headquarters, field locations and other offices. The CIMP must include the following:

   - Development of the Critical Incident Management Team (CIMT), clarification of responsibilities of relevant staff members;

- Key response procedures for crisis situations which are coordinated with local security management plans;
- Emergency contact lists especially for out of business hours;
- Procedures for communicating with and supporting for affected family members (see also Column 1 below);
- Media management;
- Communication management procedures for headquarters and families and also for media management to utmost effectiveness;
- Post-crisis management including psychological support (See Guidance Note 4).

**References**


- GPR8. (2010). Chapter 5 Incident Reporting and Critical Incident Management
- ECHO. (2004). Sections 3 (Security Preparation for the Field), 8 Headquarters management of Security), and 10 (Donors); and Sections 5 (Security Incidents), 6 (Suspension, Hibernation, Relocation, Evacuation), 7 (Closing a Programme) and 9 (Learning and Training)


**Column 1: Support to families and safety management**

When a crisis incident takes place and if any staff member is involved, it is essential for the organization to provide support to affected families. If a staff member gets infected with disease, or if they are seriously injured by accident, the following actions will be required to take:

- Appoint a family support focal point and avoid multiple staff members contacting the affected family;
- The focal point should contact the family regularly even if there is no change in situations. It would be desirable that those in the field contact headquarters each day;
- Have the consent from the affected family that the organization would contact at any time of the day if and when there is a critical development;
- Provide full and detailed explanations to the family about background of the incident, measures being taken by the medical team in the field, and organization's responses including insurance aspects;
- If there are decision to make in terms of response measures, fully explain each option along with their pros and cons before reaching the decision;
- Respect family's wishes if they intend to travel to see the affected staff member.

Organizations should have contacts of staff's family members and also inform family members of associated risks, according to nature of activities and operational contexts. Family consent is required to make needed medical treatment in some countries, and consent in person in some cases.

It is also important to talk with affected family members in sympathetic ways, rather than business like ways. This will help them lift worries and concerns and even avoid any potential troubles. The way in which organizations respond will directly affect its reputation too.

It is often the case that staff families are not familiar with infectious diseases in tropical areas or medical systems and security situations there. Hence it would be desirable to take steps above even in non-critical cases.

## Reference 2-II: Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Headquarters

**I. Introduction**

- Purpose of developing security plans at headquarters
- The organization's vision, mission, values, and safety and security policies
- The scope of the plans and who they apply to (at headquarters and relationship between the headquarters and field locations)

**II. Relationship between headquarters and field locations with respective responsibilities. Headquarters' actions and procedures according to its responsibilities**

- Security risk assessment
- Development of security plans based on security risk assessment
- Daily security measures
- Project management, security management monitoring and evaluation
- Critical incident management (see V below for details.)

**III. Operational security procedures at the headquarters and those between headquarters and field locations**

- Appointment, clarification of responsibilities and management of security focal points at headquarters
- Human and financial resource management in security
- Management lines: at headquarters and with field locations
- Communication procedures between headquarters and field locations and at the headquarters
- Security procedures for staff movements between the headquarters and field locations based on security plans at field locations

**IV. Procedures for situation, incident and accident reporting**

- Scope
- Reporting line
- Reporting frequency
- Reporting Formats

**V. Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP)**

- Critical Incident Management Team (CIMT), responsibilities of team members and other relevant staff members
- Crisis response procedure based on field CIMP
- Contact list and communication tools outside of business hours
- Procedures for contacting and maintaining communication with affected families
- Media management in risk management
- Procedures for maximizing communication effectiveness at headquarters, with affected family, and with the media (especially for immediate aftermath of the incident)
- Post-incident management including mental health and psychosocial support

**VI. Review and Update of Security Plan**

## 2.3. Security Plan in the Field

**Security Plans in the Field: why it is needed**

The organisation's security plan is based on its safety and security policy that reflects its overall approach to security. Each organization takes a different approach based on its mission (if there is one), code of conduct, policy, programmes, as well as on its understanding of the context. It is important to conduct an SRA at the planned field location and establish an appropriate security management plan when establishing a field office.

In many cases organizations do not have field offices in countries or areas where they work, but their staff members travel there on a regular basis. In such cases organizations generally fulfil their SRA remotely through researching possible security risks that their staff members may encounter and by talking to other humanitarian actors. Risk mitigating measures and CIMPs are then prepared at the headquarters level. There are cases where all the above components of a security plan are addressed by lengthy email exchanges.

**Planning Process**

The process of developing, implementing and updating a plan is as important as the plan itself. An individual should be designated to be responsible for leading the development of the security plan and for periodic reviews and updating. Those staff members who are expected to implement the plan should be involved in its development. This helps to foster consistent implementation through ensuring that (1) the plan becomes more realistic in its assumption about contexts and threats, (2) the staff understand all aspects of the plan, and (3) the plan improves staff ownership, willingness and ability to implement the plan, thereby promoting adherence to the plan. All staff members should be given a briefing on the situation and threats, a copy of the plan, and any training required to implement the plan. The plan should be tested and updated at regular intervals and whenever there is a change in the situation or threats faced by the NGO.

**Context Oriented**

Organizations need to ensure that locally relevant measures and plans are established in different security contexts and risk environments. The security plan must be based on a SRA and address identified threats. The security plan is based on the organization's safety and security policies, and so the security plan of each organization will differ depending on the operating environment, and on the organization's mission, mandate and values.

**Ownership of the Plan**

When implementing the security plan, each individual staff member should respect the SOPs and line management (see Guidance Note 4). If he/she no longer feels comfortable with the plan for any reason, it is his/her responsibility to bring this to the attention of the country representative. Individual staff members should also feel free to make observations and proposals to improve the plan. Finally, all staff should respect the confidentiality of the field security plan.

**Key Actions:**

- Conduct a Security Risk Assessment (SRA) for the operating environment to identify any potential security risks and threats. Establish mitigation measures for all identified risks based on security policies (see also Guidance Notes 1 and 3 (P36, 37), Standard 2.1 Guidance Notes 4 (P21))
- Create Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that staff should adhere to in order to prevent incidents, and how to respond should problems arise. (see also Guidance Notes 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 (P38-40) for key issues to be considered in SOPs)
- Create Critical Incident Management Plans (CIMPs) that identify the Critical Incident Management Team (CIMT) in field locations, staff members' responsibilities, and standard procedures in close liaison with headquarters. (see also Guidance Note 4 (P37))
- Introduce an incident and situation reporting system into field offices so that regular communication with and reporting to headquarters is materialized. (see also Standard 2.2 Guidance Notes 4 (P31))
- Develop security plans for field locations by covering all the items in the above and referring to "Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Field Posts (P44)" (see also Guidance Note 1-15 (P36-41) and Standard 5 Guidance Notes 2 (P57))
- Conduct periodic reviews of security plans with the participation of all relevant staff members. Carry out a review after any incident takes place and incorporate all lessons learned into the security plans. (see also Guidance Note 1 (P36) and Standard 2.2 Guidance Note 3 (P30))

**Key Indicators:**

- Field-based security plans are developed incorporating all the above key actions. All staff members at field locations and headquarters are made aware of the plans.
- A policy regarding health and safety including staff's stress management and R & R is established.
- Security training is conducted on a regular basis based on the field-based security plans.

**Guidance Notes:**

1. **Security Risk Assessments (SRA)**: Organizations need to carry out a SRA before making a final decision as to the deployment of its staff for a long term. A security risk assessment is a fundamental element of the risk management process and must be viewed as an integral part of the wider assessments involved in establishing operations or programmes in any country. The risk assessment process first identifies the different security threats within a given context, and how your staff, assets, the programmes being implemented, or the organization could be vulnerable. It would be desirable if the assessment team could spend some time to generate an understanding of the location situation, but it can also be done remotely if visiting locations is not possible. The SRA can be done solely or jointly with other organizations, and can be combined with needs assessments. For more details, see GPR8 (2010) Chapter 2 (Risk Assessment), and ECHO (2004) A26 Security Assessment. (see also Standard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors)

2. **Information Gathering**: Gathering reliable security and safety information is key to a successful SRA and to an establishment of security networks after programmes are launched. Embassies and foreign government agencies provide security notices and host governments also share important security matters and other contextual background. For example, U.S. and British embassies provide security information through their websites. The Japanese government provides security information for travellers on its website and allows any person to register with Tabi-Regi (Travel registration) to receive security notices from local embassies. In many countries, humanitarian and development actors including NGOs, the UN, and bilateral agencies have mechanisms for sharing security information including incidents that have occurred in past projects. Apart from the government and NGOs, there are security consulting organizations for humanitarians such as RedR and Safer Edge, as well as security firms which provide security services including guards, vehicle escort and consulting services. Some insurance firms offer consulting services on security risks and threat information in some areas of the world. In addition to continuous efforts to collect information from international and national media, it is recommended to gather information from the local government and local community in the area of activity. It is important to note that organizations should utilize various information resources and contact channels to collect enough information to make appropriate decisions. For more details on security networks, see Standard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors.

3. **Mitigation Measures**: A mitigation measure means to consider what can be done to reduce risks to an acceptable level. In general terms, there are three possible courses of action: (1) Reduce the threat. If feasible, reach out to or have others negotiate on your behalf with potential adversaries; (2) reduce the consequences and lessen the impact of the threat. These might usefully be termed 'contingency measures', such as first-aid protocols, crisis response procedures and in extremis pre-emptive evacuation and guidance on how to behave in the event of a serious incident; (3) Reduce or eliminate exposure by adopting additional protective measures or changing locations, for instance. The extreme version of this would be 'risk avoidance', i.e. removing the organization entirely from the threat, either permanently or temporarily. It is also important to note that there may be unique security risks for national/local staff and female staff, and to prepare appropriate mitigation measures (see also Standard 4: Human Resources Management). For more details, see GPR8 (2010) Chapter 2.7 (Risk Analysis) on mitigation measures, Standard 4: Human Resources Management on considerations for national/local and female staff, and Standard 7: Safety and Security of Local Partner Organizations on the involvement of local partner organizations.

4. **Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP) and Critical Incident Management Team (CIMT)**: In order to respond to a critical incident, an organization should develop both a CIMP and a CIMT. The CIMP should take into consideration possible critical incidents such as evacuation, relocation, hibernation, business continuity, medical evacuation (Medevac) and death of staff (national and international), and clarify the response processes. The CIMT should establish hierarchical responsibilities and draw a clear distinction between the roles played at the country office level, the regional office and global headquarters. Everyone needs to understand where they fit in. For some incidents, a CIMT may operate only at the field level, but there needs to be a clear understanding

of when to bring in the headquarters as necessary. Serious or prolonged incidents (an assassination, bomb attack, kidnapping, hostage situation or forced hibernation) or major changes such as a relocation or evacuation will typically require a dedicated CIMT. The CIMT's decisions include suspension of activities, personnel withdrawal, setting of a certain level of confidentiality, and the end-state objective (injured person evacuated, body repatriated, kidnapped staff member released). CIMT members consist of representatives of the organization, managers, and communicators at both the headquarters and field level. Communication with authorities, media, donors, and family of staff is important, and the CIMT must also include administrative, legal and financial considerations especially for the people affected by an incident who need appropriate psychological support. After an incident, the staff members involved should undergo debriefing and counselling if necessary. An after-action review should be a standard practice. For more details, see GPR8 (2010) Chapter 5 (Incident Reporting and Critical Incident Management).

5. **Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)**: Safety and security plans should clearly outline the various SOPs. SOPs are designed to ensure that safety and security best practices are maintained on a day-to-day basis and should set out clear parameters for staff (basically the 'dos and don'ts') which, if followed, will help staff to prevent or minimise safety and security risks in particular locations. SOPs might be called "operation manuals" or "guidelines" depending on the organization. SOPs can cover a wide variety of issues, such as: personal security; local laws and customs; site security and safety; staff travel and movements; vehicle safety; communications; staff health and welfare; financial management; reporting incidents; and managing information.

6. **Communication**: Communication equipment helps strengthen security if used properly. The leader of a field team should ensure that the team's communication requirements are thought through in good time to allow the despatch of any vital equipment with the team as it deploys. It is a good practice, in insecure situations, for staff to have two independent means of communication (e.g. radio and satellite phone), so that if one breaks down, communication will still be possible. In particular, avoid over-dependence on mobile phones. In a crisis a cellular telephone system is particularly vulnerable to becoming overloaded, damaged, or simply switched off by a belligerent. No communication system is fully secure. All staff should be aware of the need for information security, and the risks that can arise from interception of communications.

7. **Media**: The media can have an impact on the security management of the organization and its staff. Contact between your organization and the media should ideally be channelled through senior management or the media response office. As well as gathering information from aid agencies, the media often like to interview staff directly in the field. Responding to media interviews requires a certain set of skills (answering sensitive questions under pressure, providing contextual and correct information, etc.), and therefore they should normally be handled by staff experienced at being interviewed. After a security incident, the organization should disseminate accurate reports and appropriate responses through the media in order to avoid the spread of biased information and exaggerated rumours. The organization's managers should

therefore be aware of media reporting, and able to deal with the media effectively when appropriate. It is essential to provide media training.

8. **Travel and Movement Security**: In many field operations, the greatest security risks to staff occur during routine travel and movements, either while travelling in the field or moving to and from the office (this applies to both humanitarian and development agencies). Vehicle accidents, ambushes, shootings, carjacking, abductions, landmine incidents and other incidents while on the road account for the majority of safety and security incidents affecting aid workers. In insecure environments, vehicles are an essential tool for avoiding potential danger. However, in some situations they can actually be the cause of insecurity. An aid organization's vehicle and its occupants can be an easily identifiable target for those who want to vent their anger against a particular organization, or against humanitarian organizations in general. The new and expensive vehicles often used by organizations can also make them an ideal target for criminal groups. All the organization's vehicles, including rental vehicles, should be equipped with the appropriate safety equipment (first aid kits, fire extinguishers, seat belts, etc.). Many organizations set up guidelines for visitors to determine whether in-country visits are appropriate and if so, the travel criteria and appropriate locations for visitor accommodation.

9. **Site Security**: Organizations should determine the locations for offices, as well as hotels/guest houses for temporary lodging of staff visitors with appropriate safety and security equipment prior to project implementation. Site management includes: physical conditions and strength of the building; examination of the boundaries of the site to make sure that perimeter walls are secure; ensuring that all doors, gates and windows have adequate locks; ensuring that access points and the street area outside are well lit; considering possible escape routes; and considering vehicle parking and assembly areas. The office also should have effective controls and procedures in place to manage access. For field offices in high-risk environments, a guard force should be employed, either through direct hire or by using the services of a reputable contractor.

10. **Financial/Cash Security**: The management of financial/cash security is one of the critical issues in field operations, particularly in insecure environments. Operational managers should be familiar with financial procedures. It is also important to provide financial training for the staff to be deployed. Good financial management is a major subject, beyond the scope of this Guide. Detailed advice on financial procedures, including simple guides to NGO accounting, can be found at www.mango.org.uk. Cash storage, management, transfer, and distribution are significant points of vulnerability for a field office. Cash management and transfer are security issues, with related standards, policies, and guidelines that must be implemented and adhered to at all times. Every office in a country must decide on a safe location for cash reserves (including a reserve for emergency evacuation) and a reliable way to receive funds. A field office should consult with the financial and legal officers and advisors of local partner organizations regarding what banks, if any, are used and for what purposes. The Country Office also should assess the cash management possibilities in the area, such as the reliability and cash-withdrawal limitations of local banks or the availability of electronic payment to local businesses.

11. **Sexual Aggression**: In any area, sexual harassment and assault are incompatible with providing a safe and secure working environment and are unacceptable. Sexual aggression can be directed at men or women, but women are more often the targets. Staff members should be aware that everyone is a potential victim of sexual assault and sexual assault is the most under-reported violent crime. Each organization should clearly set Sexual Harassment Guidelines and ensure that all staff know and comply with them. Organizations will investigate all sexual harassment complaints in accordance with their policies and procedures. All staff, regardless of their gender, should receive a briefing on sexual aggression immediately upon hire. If there are security concerns for female staff, organizations should consider upgrading the accommodation or arranging a shared house for female staff members, taking into consideration the local culture and security environment. (see also Column 1).

12. **Medical Evacuation (Medevac)**: If a staff member is injured or falls ill and local medical facilities cannot provide sufficient treatment, Medevac may be needed（In humanitarian aid operations, Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC) refers to the emergency evacuation of patient to medical facility in country, whereas Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) means evacuation of patient to outside of the country. This normally happens only when a doctor advises that it is necessary. Many humanitarian organizations insure against the costs of Medevac, and have arrangements with specialist Medevac companies. If so, it is vital that all relevant staff know the procedure for making use of these. See also ECHO (2004) A20 (Medical Evacuation) for a suggested Medevac procedure.

13. **Suspension or Hibernation of Project, Relocation or Reduction of Staff**: Suspension or hibernation of a project, and relocation or reduction of staff have recently been used as measures to mitigate the security risk in insecure environments. Such action may be necessary in order to allow time for reflection on a changed security situation. It may also be used to send a signal to local authorities or to other groups that threats to humanitarian organizations are not acceptable. Suspension is likely to be more effective if carried out by all humanitarian organizations at the same time, and for the same stated reasons. Suspension may be announced in the media. Alternatively, it may be unannounced, depending on the circumstances, the threats, and on the purpose of the suspension. It is advisable to discuss the possible options for suspension with donors during the project design phase, so that funding problems are minimised if such action becomes necessary. A longer period of suspension, where staff remain at home or in a safe place for a considerable time in order to allow danger to subside, is sometimes known as hibernation. Ensure that sufficient resources (water, food, essential goods, fuel, etc.) are available for the duration of the hibernation period. An alternative to suspension or hibernation is to relocate staff to a safer location, without leaving the country. A further alternative is to reduce the number of staff working, so as to reduce the security risk.

14. **Evacuation Plan**: Evacuation is conceived as the ultimate step in a gradual reduction of exposure – from suspension of movements of certain types of staff, to suspension of operations, to partial withdrawal of staff from a site, to total withdrawal and the closure of activities. It is absolutely imperative to consider and establish the evacuation plan

beforehand, especially in high-risk environments. Bear in mind, however, that events can overtake plans. Planning through security phases, although useful, can give the impression of a linear progression, when this may not always be the case. In many situations, evacuation routes are blocked, the logistical capacity for evacuation is insufficient, or it simply becomes too dangerous to try to evacuate and staff have to stay put and weather the crisis. Security plan should be an over-arching document which includes relocation plan, hibernation plan and evacuation plan etc., thus, evacuation plan should not be considered as separated while it is one of the most important parts of security plan. Relocation and especially evacuation are difficult decisions – not just from a programmatic but also from an ethical point of view. It needs to be clear not only under what conditions an organization will evacuate or relocate, but also who has the ultimate authority to make that decision: headquarters or field representative? Can regional offices make decisions by themselves? Who has the authority after withdrawal? Is it clear to all staff that the decisions taken by management are mandatory? It is important to include evacuation in the organization's safety and security policies and plans. As far as possible, the rights and responsibilities of employers and employees should be laid down in employment contracts or in the safety and security policies. For international staff, it should be considered with the organization's human resources management. It is encouraged to consult beforehand regarding measures related to evacuation with national/local staff and local partner organizations. The evacuation/relocation plan should be regularly reviewed and discussed with staff, especially if it is becoming increasingly likely that a withdrawal will be necessary. This can be carried out through simulation exercises or a simple team meeting to review policies, procedures and plans. In the height of a crisis, individual staff may be tempted to take all sorts of unplanned steps and go to places other than the planned assembly points. The effect is likely to increase confusion, delay the evacuation and heighten the risk for everybody. No individual initiatives that deviate from the plan should be taken without prior authorization by the head of the CIMT. Key considerations are: feasible transportation under difficult scenarios; utilising mitigation measures to reduce risks; availability of transport for how many; and who can provide means of transport and other requirements including a charter plane in the absence of pre-agreement. Many evacuations and relocations depend upon collaboration between different organizations. Do not draw up a plan in isolation. While it is usually safer to travel in a vehicle convoy with other NGOs, this also means less control over how the evacuation is carried out. Discuss with other agencies beforehand, if possible, how these issues will be handled.

15. **Kidnapping/Hostage Incident**: Kidnapping refers to forced capture and detention with the explicit purpose of obtaining something in return for the captive's release. The objective and hence the motive for kidnapping vary: often it is money, though kidnappers may also demand political concessions. In other cases, what may ostensibly be a political cause may in fact be little more than an extortion racket. Globally, kidnapping has become increasingly common in recent years, including in the aid world. High-risk countries include Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Darfur (Sudan), Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Philippines (Mindanao). Kidnapping can be hard to prevent, at least against a well-organized and determined group of perpetrators, and can be a very effective way of raising funds or increasing political visibility. It is therefore a very serious threat. Key actions for reducing risks of kidnappings are: avoiding routines; reducing visibility; in-

country vetting of personnel; removing potential vulnerabilities; site protection; heightened awareness and counter-surveillance; seeking local support protection; armed protection; etc. The organization's attitude toward ransom (whether to pay or not) should be set in its safety and security policies. Personal security training covers kidnapping situations. Generally speaking, kidnapping situations cannot be dealt with only at field level, but must involve the organization's headquarters and regional offices. A kidnapping is a very complex and challenging situation, and inevitably requires the involvement of a wide range of people and organizations, including law enforcement, government agencies, the media and insurance companies, and the victim's family. Critical incident management capabilities will be required, including training, planning, preparedness exercises and the proper allocation of resources (financial, human, equipment, etc.). It is essential that NGOs make themselves aware of the resources available e.g. hostage negotiators who will have to be called upon by NGO HQs at a very early stage. Time will not be available to research this once a hostage incident is underway.

**Column 1: References on sexual aggression and harassment**

The following guide by GISF is helpful to understand gender and safety:

**Gender and Security: Guidelines for mainstreaming gender in security risk management**
https://gisf.ngo/resource/gender-and-security/

GISF also has the guide below, aiming to support aid organizations in preventing, being prepared for and responding to incidents to sexual violence against their staff. It is intended as a good practice guide to help strengthen existing process and support organizations as they set up their own protocols:

**Managing Sexual Violence against Aid Workers: prevention, preparedness, response and aftercare**
https://gisf.ngo/resource/managing-sexual-violence-against-aid-workers/

See also the UN policy on sexual harassment below:

**UN System Model Policy on Sexual Harassment**
https://www.unsystem.org/content/un-system-model-policy-sexual-harassment-0

**Column 2: Low-Profile Approach**

Low-visibility programming has become an increasingly common protective tactic among aid organizations in high-risk environments. It involves removing organizational branding from office buildings, vehicles, residences and individual staff members. It can also involve the use of private cars or taxis, particularly vehicles that blend into the local context, limiting movement and removing tell-tale pieces of equipment, such as Very High Frequency (VHF) radios or satellite phones and HF antennas. In certain very high-risk environments, anything that might link staff to an organization – memory sticks, organization identity documents, cell

phones, and computers – may be 'sanitised'. Staff likely to stand out from the local population may be redeployed. In Iraq, more radical steps have included staff using false names, working with no fixed operating address and not being told the identities of colleagues. Beneficiaries were purposefully not made aware of the source of their assistance. Another tactic of a low-visibility approach is to use removable (e.g. magnetic) logos for vehicles, which can be removed in areas where visibility is discouraged. Knowing when to display a logo and when to take it off demands a very good, localised and dynamic risk assessment. A low-profile, low-visibility approach poses significant challenges. It can make programming more complicated, particularly in extreme cases, and can distance the organization from sources of information that might otherwise enhance its security. It might also lead to suspicions and misperceptions of what the organization is doing, undermining acceptance.

**Column 3: Use of Armoured Vehicles**

Whether or not aid agencies should use armoured vehicles in environments requiring high security has long been debated due to organizations having different approaches to security concerns. The Generic Security Guide, produced by the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operation (ECHO) under the European Commission, suggests that armoured vehicles should be used in extreme cases by some humanitarian organizations. "They are expensive, heavy and require special training to drive. Most civilian armoured vehicles provide protection against only a limited range of threats. In most cases such vehicles are not necessary, and if they are necessary, it may be best not to work in that area at all. Seek experienced advice before deciding to procure them." It is better to carefully consider when to use them, for what purpose and for how long. See also, ECHO (2004) Section 4.10 (b) Vehicles.

## Reference 2-III: Sample Outline of a Security Plan for Field Posts

### I. Introduction
- Purpose of the plan
- Identification of the person(s) responsible for security and for leading the development, review and updating of the plan
- Intended users of the plan (which staff, locations, etc. are covered)
- Location of master plan and distribution list

### II. Background
- Organization's mission, mandate, principles and safety and security policies
- Context summary (political, economic, historical, military, etc.)

### III. Security Risk Assessment (SRA)
- Current security situations
- Identification of safety ans security threats
- Mitigation measures (list of necessary responses to reduce risks)
- Risk analysis (impacts, likelihood, and mitigation measures and risk threshold)

### IV. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)
Outline procedures for daily operations and routines, and individual responses to incidents. For all procedures, include (1) do/don't, (2) how to do it, as appropriate, (3) who does it/with whom, (4) when it is to be done; frequency and sequence, and (5) where it is to be done.
- Site selection and management (offices, residences, etc.)
- Movement and transport (vehicles, convoys, etc.)
- Communications (regular use and during emergencies)
- Post-incident actions (reporting, analysis, etc.)

### V. Critical Incident Management Plan (CIMP)
Outline procedures for incidents requiring multi-layered, organizational responses. Include same pieces of information covered by the SOPs above. Include also lines of communication and reporting. Alternative options should be included.
- Evacuation
- Medical evacuation (Medevac)
- Death of staff
- Other high risk, foreseeable incident
- Critical Incident Management Team (CIMT)

### VI. Supporting Information
- Warden system, emergency communication system
- Contact information of cooperating agencies, government agencies, airport, hospital, etc. (phone numbers, radio frequencies, etc.)
- Maps showing assembly points, routes, and boundaries
- Emergency supply inventory
- Incident reporting forms
- Business Continuity Plan (BCP)

**Standard 3: Resources**

*Signatories shall make available the appropriate financial, human and other resources to mitigate the safety and security risks identified through the organization's security risk analysis.*

**Key Actions:**

- Set out clear guidelines to budget for safety and security purposes. The budget should include: staff costs, training, investigation/monitoring/evaluation, networking, operation costs, and overhead costs . (see also Guidance Notes 2 and 3 (P43))
- If sufficient resources are not secured for safety and security purposes, revise the original programme plan so that the organization can implement the programme within available budget so as to avoid incurring safety risks beyond the threshold and costs beyond its financial capacity. (See Guidance Note 4 (P47))
- If the donor is not willing to fund necessary security costs, advocate towards the donor to change its policies as an NGO community member. This will contribute to the development of whole NGO-wide resources. (See Guidance Note 4 (P47)).

**Key Indicators:**

- Organizations have procedures to inform all relevant sections/persons in charge of budget planning of the results of security risk assessment.
- Organizations allocate sufficient levels of resources for staff, pay and working environment. This should be applied to partners organizations too.
- Organizations secure resources research/needs assessment, local stakeholder engagement[14], networking with other humanitarian and development actors, and monitoring/evaluation as part of project cycle management.
- Fore remotely managed projects, organizations secure sufficient resources to establish effective communication with partner organizations (e.g. meeting in a third country or in Japan) and to conduct proper monitoring and evaluation. (Refer to Standard 7 Safety and Security of Local Partner Organizations).
- Organizations secure sufficient financial and human resources for their staff members to participate in internal and external security training and capacity development programmes, including those resources for local partner organizations.
- Organizations adopt an open policy for sharing security costs with other NGOs to pursue scale merit and cost effectiveness, i.e. security advisors, offices, special types of vehicle, evacuation, etc.

**Guidance Notes:**

1. **Resources to Meet the Standards - A Challenge for Japanese NGOs**: Based on the results of security risk analysis, organizations inevitably need to take some mitigation measures

[14] Stakeholders for project implementation by NGOs may include local authorities, non-state actors, local leaders, local communities, local NGOs, local partners/staff, international NGOs, the UN and governmental organizations.

and this in turn requires financial, human and other resources. However, this Standard may be one of the greatest challenges for most Japanese NGOs in comparison with those of the U.S. and Europe. Some deliberate and innovative approaches by the NGO community are expected to fill the gap between the supply and demand of resources.

2. **Budget Planning Policy**: Budget planning based on proper security risk analysis is a crucial part of security management in conceiving a project. As security management involves human resources management and collaboration with other humanitarian and development actors, the planning requires not only expenses for facilities and equipment but also other resources such as personnel as well as stakeholder engagement to fulfil all the safety and security standards.

   - In some organizations, budgets are set independently by the staff in the administration or finance section and thus costs associated with security measures both at headquarters and field levels may not be properly included. To avoid such practice, organizations should have procedures in place for sharing the results of security risk analyses with all relevant persons and sections or should conduct an analysis involving all persons and sections concerned with budget planning.
   - Costs associated with research, assessment, and stakeholder engagement which involves local communities are essential for NGO security management from "acceptance" strategy perspectives. Such costs should be incorporated within project plans.
   - Resources for collaboration with other humanitarian and development actors need to be put aside as administrative/overhead costs at headquarters. These resources are essential for security information sharing, training and coordination.
   - When implementing projects with local partner organizations, the organization should analyse security risks specific to these local organizations, and secure resources required to take necessary measures.

3. **Budget Designing**: In projects funded by UN agencies and other institutional donors, costs associated with the security of facilities, safe travels, communication, insurance, and security positions can be incorporated in proposals and budgets. However, funding for assessment, evaluation, training, stakeholder engagement, and networking with other actors need to be included as part of overhead (i.e. indirect) costs at headquarters.

   - Information on supporting programmes for security training is given in Reference 3-I.
   - Organizations should discuss and share information with the NGO community on line items accepted by donors to set standard practices. Information on items accepted by major Japanese donors is given in Reference 3-II.
   - Cost sharing with other NGOs is one way of reducing security expenses. Costs can be shared by joining existing security networks in the field or by forming an ad hoc consortium in response to particular crises. Examples of expenses include: security related personnel, office or communication means, special type of transportation, evacuation means including insurance, security information, etc.

4. **Project Review and Advocacy by the NGO Community**: If organizations find it difficult to mobilize sufficient resources to take required security measures, they should revise the security plan as well as project plan itself. If the difficulty is mainly on account of the donor policy of funding for security expenses, organizations should express opinions as an NGO community member to raise awareness and change the policy of donors. (see also Standard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors)

   - Organizations need to be aware that project implementation without sufficient resources for safety and security can pose intolerable risks and overcapacity on their staff members.
   - Organizations should work on or collaborate with a NGO community for advocacy for donors that the costs of security measures should include personnel expenses with proper working conditions, training as well as stakeholder engagement and networking.
   - If Japanese donors do not fund any safety and security cost items, organizations could work with network NGOs in Japan working for advocacy including JaNISS.

**Reference 3-I: Support Programme for Security Training**

**1. UNHCR Regional Centre for Emergency Preparedness (eCentre)**

- eCentre annually hosts a Security Risk Management (SRM, mainly for senior managers) and Safety in the Field (SIF, mainly for field staff members) workshops once or twice in Thailand, as part of various programmes.
- All costs for training, travel and accommodation are covered by eCentre.
- As eCentre's mission is to build and develop the capacity of people working for UN agencies, government departments, and NGOs in the Asian Pacific region to prepare and respond to emergencies, its programmes in Thailand are limited for those working in the region. Two or three places on average are offered to Japanese NGOs in each workshop and there usually is a large number of applicants. Nevertheless, there have been cases in which 4 or 5 NGO staff members were accepted, sometimes even those working in other regions. Staff members, regardless of their duty stations, are encouraged to apply.
- Since 2017, eCentre has been organizing SRM, SIF, and relevant training-of-trainer (TOT) programmes in Japan for Japanese NGO staff members in collaboration with JaNISS. In these programmes, 25 places for SRM and SIF and another 15 places for TOT programmes are offered.
- Workshop information can be obtained from UNHCR's Tokyo Office and also from the JaNISS website.

**2. Japan NGO Initiative for Safety and Security (JaNISS)**

- As of 2020, JaNISS organizes the following programmes in Japan:
  - Security Risk Management (SRM) (3 days) and its TOT (2 days)
  - Safety in the Field (SIF, 5 days) and its TOT (2 days)
  - Security Risk Management for beginners (1 and a half days)
  - First aid primary and intermediate courses (1 day each)

- Participants need to pay fees. Most programmes are held in Tokyo areas, but travel and accommodation costs may be covered by JaNISS. Participations costs from overseas can be funded by JaNISS.
- In addition to training programmes, JaNISS organizes study seminars on infectious diseases, insurance policies, security management, and other topics.
- Information is available on the JaNISS website.

**3. NGO Overseas Study Programme of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA)**

- This programme is offered by the NGO division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) to support Japanese NGOs to send their staff members overseas to attend capacity-building and human resource development training programmes. The MOFA outsources the management of the programme (to JANIC in 2020) and applications are accepted two to three times a year.
- Participation in safety security training programmes overseas can be funded by this programme.
- Costs for training, travel and accommodation will be covered by the programme (each line item has a maximum limit).
- Information is available at the MOFA website.

**4. Japan Platform (JPF)**

- JPF funds costs of attending training programmes organised by external organizations, if the need to take part in such programme is recognized. This applies to everyone, including international staff, national and local staff, and the staff of partner organizations.
- For the staff at headquarters, the costs associated with training for those who need to travel to the field are covered.
- When adequate training programme is not available in the project location, costs for attending a programme in a third country will be funded.

## Reference 3-II. Security Costs that Can Be Funded by Japanese Donors

**A. Japan Platform (funding the guideline revised on March 13, 2020)**

- Insurance: travel insurance including war-premium service can be included as "insurance cost", and also insurance provision for evacuation in "security and labour safety cost".
- Visa: Visa issuance fees for third countries for evacuation purposes can be included in "visa expense".
- Office facility: Security related office facility cost can be included in "field post set-up expenses" or "security and labour safety expenses".
- Office equipment: Security related equipment can be included in "security and labour safety expenses".
- Vehicle: Security related vehicle cost can be included in "local transportation expense".
- Communication: Communication equipment necessary for security management can be included in "field office admin equipment and supply expenses" and communication cost in "communication and bank transfer expenses".

- Personnel: Both for international and national/local staff, all personnel costs including statutory welfare benefits covered by the employer can be included in personnel cost, under the limit of the JPF personnel expense standard. Personnel costs for security managers and security officers can also be included.
- Security training cost: In some programmes, security training expenses can be included in the budget. (refer to Article 4. of Reference 3-II above)
- Expense for travel to headquarters during the project period and R&R: It can be included in "travel expense".
- Guard and other security related expenses: Guard and other security related expenses can be included in "security and labour safety expenses".
- Overhead cost: A maximum of 5% of the total expense in the field can be allocated as overhead cost. Documented evidence must be submitted.

**B. Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects (N-Ren, based on guideline for fiscal year 2020)**

- Insurance: war-premium service and insurance for evacuation can be included in "travel cost" or in "expenses for other security measures", when the need to include these is recognized.
- Visa: Visa issuance fees for third countries for evacuation purposes can be included in "expenses for other security measures".
- Office facility: Security related facility cost can be included in "expenses for other security measures".
- Office equipment: Security related equipment can be included in "office supply expense" or "expenses for other security measures".
- Vehicle: Security related vehicle cost can be included in "vehicle procurement/lease expenses" or "expenses for other security measures".
- Communication: Communication equipment related to security can be included in "Office equipment procurement/lease expenses" or "expenses for other security measures" and communication cost in "communication expense".
- Personnel: For international staff, basic salary with some allowances including that for managerial positions can be included. However, statutory welfare benefits covered by employers and other allowances including those for over-time or accommodation can NOT be included. For national/local staff, only basic salary and statutory social benefits including the cost covered by the employer can be included. They can be approved within the limitation rate for MOFA's standard both for international and local staff. The salary for paid holidays can NOT be included for either international or local staff.
- Expense for travel to headquarters during the project period and rest and recreation (R&R): The expense for travel between the field and headquarters can be approved for only one time at be beginning and end of a project period. In principle, the expense for travel to headquarters for meetings and rest during the project period, as well as R&R in a third country, cannot be approved.
- Security training: Security training expenses cannot be included. However, for the security training and exercises provided by the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the travel expenses to the venue(s) can be included both in Japan and in a country of activities, only for one person of Japanese nationality, once in one project, if the person has not participated in the training before.

- Guard and other security measure expenses: Guard and other security related expenses can be included in "expenses for other security measures".
- Overhead costs: A maximum of 5% of the total expenses in the field can be allocated as overhead. Documented evidence must be submitted. Direct costs for the project can NOT be included here.

## Standard 4: Human Resources Management

*Signatories shall have personnel guidelines and procedures that prepare employees to cope with safety and security issues at their post of assignment, support them during their service, and address post assignment issues.*

Organizations should work on hiring and retaining qualified staff and demonstrate their duty of care to staff, through proper orientation, training, insurance and support. Organizations should have policies and procedures in place that include national/local staff in the security risk management systems and that address the unique security concerns of national/local staff.

**Key Actions:**

- Identify those positions that have a critical role in staff security and clearly define security responsibilities and specific decision-making roles in their Terms of Reference (TOR) (Guidance Note 1 (P52)); ,
- Establish organizations' personnel policies in which security responsibilities for individual positions are explained (Guidance Note 2 and 4 (P52), Standard 2.1 Guidance Note 6 (P25));
- Provide clear guidance as to stress management for international and national/local staff members (e.g. safe working environment, appropriate working hours, measures for international staff including R & R) (Guidance Note 3 (P52), see Guidance Note 6 (P53) for support to staff's family);
- Consider gender-specific vulnerabilities for the staff, follow relevant international standards and guidelines, and establish policies accordingly (Guidance Note 5 (P52));
- Provide information on required security training for international and national/local staff members (Guidance Notes 8 and 9 (P53));
- Have clear policies as to health benefits and insurances for international and national/local staff members (Guidance Note 10 (P53));
- Consider context-specific vulnerabilities for the national/local staff and translate security policies and plans into local languages as appropriate (Guidance Note 12 (P54)).

**Key Indicators:**

- Staff have access to the following documents:
  - Organization's safety and security policies, staff care and support policies;
  - Each position's clear ToR with scope of responsibilities;
  - Project plans with outcomes of risk assessment of security, travel and health.
- The above-mentioned policies and documents are reviewed on a regular basis.
- The following training is given to staff at all levels:
  - Organizational risk assessment;
  - Global security situation surrounding humanitarian and development aid;
  - Responses to the media and support to family during security incidents;
  - Personal security management in the field.

**Guidance Notes:**

1. **Terms of Reference (TOR):** It is desirable to outline the specific roles and responsibilities for the different functions for all positions in the organization in writing. By clarifying individual positions' scope of work, it becomes possible to prevent unbalanced workload to certain individuals and staff burnout. It is also useful to have each role's responsibilities before, during and after the incident clarified so as to avoid being dysfunctional during crisis.

2. **Pre-assignment briefing**: In advance of staff's deployment, organizations must ensure staff are provided with verbal and written briefings on all risks relevant to the role to be undertaken, and that measures are in place to mitigate those risks, including insurance cover. The organization need to receive informed consent prior to departure. It is important that the line management and security management structure are clear to all staff so that communication between headquarters and field office flows smoothly. See CHS for more details about human resources management. (see Standard 1: Guidance note 7)
3. **Stress Management**: Managing stress is the responsibility of not only the individual but also the organization. Organizations should be aware that more staff experience stress than security threats, and that stress affects their performance, motivation, and also their turnover. Staff often work long hours in risky and stressful conditions. An organization's duty of care to its workers includes actions to promote well-being and avoid long-term exhaustion, burnout, injury or illness. When the organization deploys staff to a high-pressure area, they are required to receive regular 'rest and recreation (R&R)' to help prevent stress and illness and to improve efficiency. Post-deployment support including PTSD response is also required if necessary. Speaking about managing stress may be received differently in some cultures, and organizations should be aware that national/local staff may have a different attitude towards stress. (see also Column 1 below)

4. **Roles of Managers**: Managers must make aid workers aware of the risks and protect them from exposure to unnecessary threats to their physical and emotional health. Measures that can be adopted include effective security management, preventive health advice, active support to work reasonable hours and access to psychological support when required. Managers can promote a duty of care by demonstrating good practices and personally complying with policy. Aid workers also need to take personal responsibility for managing their own well-being. Psychosocial support should be immediately available to workers who have experienced or witnessed extremely distressing events.

5. **Gender specific considerations:** While the majority of victims of sexual violence are female, there exist specific threats and risks according to gender. Sexuality can have an impact on vulnerability to threats too. Organization's security risk assessment should include these aspects. Generally women and gender-variant minority group are aware of their vulnerabilities. It is also important to remember that male staff can also be victims of sexual assault. (see also Sexual Assault in Standard 2.3)

6. **Family care**: The organization's security policy and plan should include care and support for staff's families during critical incidents. In some cases, staff's families should be informed about security risks associated with deployment in advance. While responding to any critical incident involving staff, the organization must reassure families by communicating closely and providing support. Family care is an integral part of risk management plan and it is important to select a focal point in the organization for affected families as part of duty of care. (see Standard 2.2 Security Plan at Headquarters Guidance Note 4 and Column 1)

7. **Relocation and Evacuation**: Staff policy regarding relocation and evacuation should clearly be communicated to all staff in advance. International staff need to understand that they must follow the decision of the organization to evacuate, while individual staff members have the right to request to withdraw from risky areas when they feel insecure. Should international staff refuse or decline to be evacuated they should be informed that they will no longer be covered by insurance and will be separated from the organization. It is a good practice to discuss with national/local staff what their intentions would be in the event of their being relocated within the country during the periods of emergency. Would they wish to remain or relocated? Those remaining could be mobilized to implement the continuity of operations after the international staff is evacuated. It is better to do this during a period of calm rather than when the emergency is imminent.

8. **Providing Security Risk Management (SRM) training opportunities**: Organizations should provide security training opportunities according to individual staff members' job scopes and especially training related to the risks that they are expected to handle with. It is critical to learn from other agencies and network organizations and also mobilize experienced staff members for providing training, guidance, and advice. In programmes offered by JaNISS and UNHCR eCentre, there are opportunities to exchange lessons and experiences. (see also Standard 3 Resources, Reference 3-1)

9. **First Aid Training:** In addition to security training, all staff members should receive first aid training, which can be highly useful for those who work in remote and difficult environments. Red Cross and Red Crescent national societies in many countries offer such training programmes. In Japan, local fire fighting departments organize training programmes. JaNISS provides NGO with first aid training opportunities on a regular basis too.

10. **Insurance**: All staff should be covered by appropriate insurance, and for those who are deployed to higher risk destinations should be provided with special insurance which refunds the costs incurred by an organization in supporting staff affected by conflict or terrorist attacks. Insurance for repatriating seriously injured or sick staff members can be very costly. Proper risk assessment should be carried out before arranging insurance provision. Similarly, all local and national staff members should be provided with comprehensive insurance packages. The availability of insurance policies and insurance companies vary from country to country, hence the organization need to take appropriate measures according to local situations.

More details are given in Column 2 and 3 below.
For staff members employed in Japan, the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance Act regulates that employers must provide insurance against staff's potential injury, disease, disability and death during work and commuting. This act can be applied to the staff deployed overseas but a separate registration is needed in advance. This act does not apply to the staff who travel to countries for a short period of time. For more details, see the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare's website.
https://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/seisakunitsuite/bunya/koyou_roudou/roudoukijun/rousai/kanyu.html

11. **Staff recruitment**: Recruiting the right national/local staff is crucial when an organization is new to an environment and needs to respond urgently to an emergency. Background check should be conducted, and short-term contracts may be appropriate depending on the situation.

12. **Special care for national/local staff:** It is mandatory that national/local staff are involved in formulating, reviewing and implementing security and safety policies and plans, to make sure that their culture is considered. National/local staff should be given an explanation of the organization's rules and regulations on human resources in their own language(s). Their TORs, evacuation plans and crisis management should also be explained. The recruitment and assignment of staff requires consideration of a well-balanced team, with respect for local culture and customs. National/local staff, on the one hand, have a better understanding of the social, cultural and political environment in the field and better access to local networks which help them to gather information from the local context, but on the other hand, they may face various pressures from other actors in society that should also be taken account of.

**Column 1: Stress management**
In recent years there has been growing recognition of the importance of workplace stress management, as seen in a new piece of legislation of Japan's Industrial Safety and Health Act in 2015. In this legislation, all entities which hire more than 50 people must appoint occupation physicians and conduct staff stress level surveys. Some NGOs make it mandatory for those staff members who have returned to Japan to go through medical counselling. The following websites provide information stress level surveys:

Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare:
https://kokoro.mhlw.go.jp/

National Information Center of Stress and Disaster Mental Health:
https://saigai-kokoro.ncnp.go.jp/index.html

**Column 2: Travel insurance**
This section provides information on travel insurance which Japanese NGOs can arrange. Insurance claims are usually made in countries where the policies are arranged, except for travel insurance. For national local staff members, insurance needs to be arranged in the countries where they work. Japanese insurance companies may able to recommend some

local insurance companies when they have information. In countries where insurance provision is absent or almost absent, NGOs still needs to take mitigation measures with consideration for local customs. It is recommended to consult with local NGOs, international organization offices, and private companies, as appropriate. One example is that the organization deducts a certain amount from staff's salaries for insurance premium.

Travel insurance policy items:
Accidental death, accident physical impediment, sickness death, medical and rescuer's expenses, personal liability, damage to personal belongings, and flight delay expenses.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs' NGO grant scheme guideline provides information on insurance policies which can be included in budgets:

- Accidental death: benefit maximum JPY 50,000,000
- Accident physical impediment: benefit maximum JPY 50,000,000
- Medical and rescuer's expenses: no limit
- Sickness death: benefit maximum JPY 30,000,000
- Personal liability: benefit maximum JPY 100,000,000

JANIC offers 20% reduced price insurance coverage for member NGOs, contracting with Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Group. This service includes war-risk cover.
On management-related insurance policies, see Column 2 in Standard 1 in this guidebook.

**Column 3: Repatriation and evacuation services**
In deploying staff to high-risk areas or countries, NGOs need to consider arranging emergency response and evacuation insurance, which potentially mobilizes chartered or other private flights. British companies such as International SOS and Control Risk offer such services.
In Japan, Emergency Assistance Japan provides "Security Assistance Programme", including evacuation itself and associated consulting services. Aoi Nissay Dowa Insurance and Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co., LTD also offer similar services.

**References**


- CHS Alliance, Group URD and the Sphere Project. (2014). *Core Humanitarian Standard on Quality and Accountability*, Commitment 8.
- People in Aid. (2003). *Code of Good Practice in the Management and Support of Aid Personnel*, Principle Seven (Health, Safety and Security)
- ECHO. (2004). A25 (Rest and Recreation) and A35 (Stress)
- GPR8. (2010). Chapter 4 (Evacuation, Hibernation, Remote Management Programming and Return), Chapter 6 (People in Security Management), and Annex 5 (Insurance).

## Standard 5: Accountability

*Signatories shall incorporate management systems that will ensure accountability for safety and security at both headquarters and field levels, and all personnel understand their respective roles and responsibilities.*

Setting standards for security and safety will be more likely to be sustained if there is a good structure of accountability in place with clear lines of responsibility for each of them, and a process by which people are held accountable for these responsibilities. Those with responsibilities must have proportionate authorities. An effective security management structure will foster a positive security culture and help the organization to fulfil its duty of care obligations.

**Key Actions:**

- Assign an individual or a group of staff within the organization who can act as a security focal point and/or working group in order to take the lead in developing and implementing the security management framework. (see also Guidance Note 1 (P56))
- Provide briefing and introductory sessions on the organization's mission and values, security roles and responsibilities to staff members at all levels both at headquarters and the field locations. (see also Guidance Note 2 (P57))
- Conduct a periodic organizational security review by a means such as evaluations of employees' and management performance on security related responsibilities, drills of Critical Incident Management, and review of safety and security plan. (see also Guidance Note 3 (P58), Planning Process at Standard 2.3 (P35))

**Key Indicators:**

- Security management systems are established at headquarters and field offices, based on the organization's security policies and plans, regardless of the organization's size.
- Reporting lines for authority and decision-making are clearly established and all staff members understand to whom they are accountable.
- Staff at all levels within the organization, from the governing bodies to individual staff members, share a collective responsibility for safety and security.
- Procedures to address non-compliance and violations of established safety and security policies and procedures are in place and made known to staff members.
- Staff members comply with the organization's safety and security policies and plan, and their procedures.

**Guidance Notes:**

1. **Create an Effective Security Risk Management Structure**: Ultimate accountability for staff security and safety rests with the governing bodies, such as the Board of Trustees, who then delegate responsibility to the Executive Director/CEO, or a position of similar seniority, to ensure that effective SRM is in place. Day-to-day management and

responsibility for security is shared across different levels in the organization, following the line of management.

Therefore, it is necessary to identify existing positions with a critical role in staff security and safety, including managers based in the field and at the headquarters. Furthermore, the security responsibilities and specific decision-making roles of each of these positions should be defined in respective staff members' job descriptions. Their security responsibilities should be included in the organization's safety and security policies so that all staff members are informed.[15]

Many organizations appoint individual staff or a group of staff to act as a security working group and/or security focal point to support the development of the organization's SRM framework, ensure there are agreed policies and procedures in place, as well as provide advice to the line of management if required. The advantage of appointing a group of staff representing different roles and levels within the organization is to bring a wide range of experience and perspectives, and encourage a greater sense of ownership. It is important that these people are given adequate time, support and training to do these tasks in addition to their usual tasks. It is also important to note that the security focal point or working group is not responsible for managing security risks. Instead, security management responsibilities must remain embedded within the normal line management (see "Example Structure and Responsibilities" on the following page).

When identifying specific security roles and responsibilities, it is necessary to be realistic for the organization considering its size, the complexity of its structure, and existing roles and capacities.

2. **Collective Responsibility for Safety and Security**: Security awareness is an ongoing collective responsibility. Each staff, therefore, is obliged to actively participate in and contribute to the maintenance of security measures, be aware of and responsible for their own security risks and team security, and understand and adhere to security measures. It is important to develop a security-aware culture within the organization, and to treat security as an organization-wide priority, not a sensitive management issue to be discussed only by a few staff members behind closed doors. For example, the following considerations could be useful to develop a culture of security in the organization:

    - Staff designated as Security Focal Points must be encouraged to attend security training courses as run by International Safety Organization (INSO), UNHCR or other NGOs and to enrol in online courses run by Global Inter-Agency Security Forum (GISF).
    - Make sure that all staff members are familiar with the context, risk and commitments of the organization in terms of risk reduction and security management.

[15] For concrete examples of security responsibilities, see GPR8 (2010) Chapter 6 (People in Security Management); Care International. (n.d.) *Role of Safety and Security Management in an Emergency*. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from https://www.careemergencytoolkit.org/management/14-safety-and-security/1-role-of-safety-and-security-management-in-an-emergency/; and Mercy Corps. (2011). Field Security Manual (March 2011).

- Make sure that all staff members understand their individual responsibilities with regard to security, teamwork and discipline.
- Advise and assist staff to address their medical, financial and personal insurance matters prior to deployment to a high-risk environment.
- Be clear about the expectations of managers and management styles under normal and high-stress circumstances.
- Ensure that security is a key consideration in all programme planning.

Mainstreaming a security culture means considering security implications involved in everything the organization does, from discussions about programme design and public messages to funding decisions and the hiring of external contractors. It is also crucial to make sure that all staff, including national/local staff, know the organization and its mission in any given context. Staff need to be told what the organization is about. Key questions include:

- Why is this organization here?
- What is it doing here?
- Where does it get its money from? What does it use that money for?
- Who directs its activities?
- Is it serving foreign political interests?
- What is its political agenda?
- Does it want to change local society, culture, values or religion?

Consider providing staff with some written materials in their own language(s), and go through them with staff in an interactive way. Furthermore, periodically bring staff together to hear from them what sorts of questions and comments they most regularly get from those in the community and how they answer them. It is important to remind every member that they should behave as a positive representative of the organization. Each member is responsible for reporting to their line manager regarding any action or behaviour that breaches policy or jeopardises team security.

3. **Measures to Enhance Accountability**: The following activities may enhance the organization's accountability for security.

- **Periodical security briefings and drills** will enhance staff members' knowledge of lines of responsibility and authority. Outcomes of drills will help review the organizational effectiveness of management systems and structures (lines of responsibility, human resources, technology, procurement, etc.).
- All staff with security responsibilities must have their duties clearly articulated in their **job description**, and, for accountability, assessed in their **performance review**.
- **Violations of security policies and procedures** have clear consequences for the violators which are spelled out in the human resources policy. Procedures to address non-compliance and violations of established safety and security policies and procedures should be in place and made known to staff members at all levels.

**References**

- GPR8. (2010). Chapter 1.2 (Organizational Security Management)
- InterAction. (n.d.). *Security Risk Management – NGO Approach*
- Shaun Bickley. (2017). *Security Risk Management: A Basic Guide for Smaller NGOs*. European Interagency Security Forum (EISF). Chapter 3 (Governance and Accountability)

## Reference 5-I: Example Structure anesponsibilities




*Source: Shaun Bickley. (2017). Security Risk Management: a Basic Smaller NGOs.* European Interagency Security Forum

*Notes: Individual organizations need to decide where volunteers and interns are placed in their structures.*

## Standard 6: Collaboration with Other Actors

*Signatories shall actively participate in safety and security related forums at both headquarters and field levels and collaborate with other members of the humanitarian and development communities to advance their common safety and security interests.*

Although security management is considered to be largely agency-centred, there are many good reasons why the agencies should cooperate each other. Security will be dramatically enhanced through coordination, information sharing and the recognition that the behaviour of an individual NGO can impact on the security of the entire humanitarian community (which could be described as a "sense of community").

**Key Actions:**

- The importance of safety and security collaboration with other agencies in the humanitarian and development sector is understood within the organization. (see also Guidance Notes 1, 2, 3 (P61-62))
- A focal point person is appointed to attend safety and security forum meetings. Their responsibilities are clearly described in their TOR. (see also Standard 5 Guidance Note 1 (P56) and Reference 5-I: Example Structure and Responsibilities (P60)).
- Actively participates in security forums organized by NGOs and/or UN agencies at the headquarters and/or field office levels. The organization is recognized as a member of the safety and security community both at headquarters and the field level (see also Guidance Notes 3,4 (P63-64))

**Key Indicators:**

- Official and non-official personal relationships increase the exchange of security information from reliable sources.
- The organization has a written list of security forums.
- The responsibility to play an active part in security forums is clearly stated in the job description of the person in charge.
- Financial and human resources are secured for taking collaborative action.

**Guidance Notes:**

1. **Advantages of Collaboration**: Some of the advantages of collaboration include:

   - A better alert system: Agencies can receive a fuller picture of actual or possible security threats or alerts in their environment, thus increasing the chance of avoiding an incident (such as using a 'communications tree' for wireless radios, walkie-talkies, satellite phones, etc.).
   - Better SRA: Maintaining a shared record of all incidents in an operating environment provides a better basis for a risk assessment than a partial or incomplete record.
   - Strategic and tactical monitoring and analysis of the operating environment: All agencies do this by contacting other agencies informally to obtain information. Trust

and confidentiality make it possible to collaborate in a more structured way.

- Cost-effective services: For example, the costs for security training can be shared, rather than each agency individually covering the costs of bringing in or hiring specialists.
- Liaison with the authorities: Rather than negotiating individually, agencies can make a stronger and more consistent case together. This would include exchanging information with military actors.
- Advocacy with donors: If the security situation deteriorates and several agencies conclude that they need extra financial resources for additional mitigating measures, they may be able to make a more effective case with donors collectively.
- The operations of and/or conduct of one organization can impact the security of other members of the humanitarian and development communities. Actively seeking to minimize all the negative impacts that the organization's operations have on others can make a difference.

2. **Information Sharing**: Making good decisions requires reliable and accurate information. All information must be considered against the reliability of the source, the number of individuals and organizations reporting the same information, and any local bias. Sharing of significant information has many benefits, from corroboration and verification to increasing the organization's knowledge base. Examples of useful information that might be shared include incident reports and analyses, situation reports, threat assessments, and security training. In order to share security related information with other actors, the organization should establish policies and procedures for sharing such information (who decides what information could be shared with whom and how).

3. **Participation in Security Forums**: There are many security-related forums at both headquarters and field office levels. Participation in these security forums provides opportunities to share useful information, exchange good practices, and consider the larger picture of safety and security in both the global and operational environments. It is strongly advised that organizations join such security forums to gather information and to identify good practices for the particular operation. Security forums are usually chaired by one organization and attended by respective security focal points.

   When appointing a staff member to attend the coordination meetings, ensure the person is supported to dedicate time as a priority, and is fully briefed on the rules for participation. The staff should know how the information is to be shared and managed. If there is no security forum, NGOs are encouraged to take the initiative with other agencies to collaborate on holding a meeting. Security forums are useful mechanisms for improving organizations' understanding of the current international standards related to security management, and for improving awareness on security management for small NGOs. Security forums can also share the costs of organizing training for staff, and act as a coordination point with other actors such as the United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS).

When deemed appropriate by an organization, it can participate in "Saving Lives Together (SLT)" [16], which is a framework aimed at enhancing UN and NGO security collaboration in field operations. The objective of SLT is to enhance the ability of partner organizations to make informed decisions and implement effective security arrangements to improve the safety and security of personnel and operations, while operational decisions made on the basis of such information remain the responsibility of the respective organizations. In larger operations it will be found that UN OCHA conduct regular security/coordination briefings at which NGOs are welcomed. Attendance at such gatherings is encouraged.

4. **Sources of Additional Information**: There are a number of sources of additional information that organizations can link into to improve the flow of information on security incidents, find advice on how to mitigate security risks from various threats and improve security capacity:

   - Host government departments (national security forces including police when appropriate);
   - National governments, including donor governments and their embassies;
   - United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), and other UN Agencies such as United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR);
   - Insurance providers, which often have a threat advisory service linked to various countries and regions;
   - NGO security consultants, such as International NGO Security Organization (INSO);
   - Local commercial security providers (guard companies);
   - International and national media;
   - Other NGOs and their partner organizations – both national and international NGOs;
   - Host and beneficiary communities; and
   - National staff.

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[16] See Inter-Agency Standing Committee. (2015). *Saving Lives Together: A Framework for Improving Security Arrangements Among IGOs, NGOs and UN in the Field (October 2015).* Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/collaborative-approaches-field-security/content/saving-lives-together-framework-improving-security-0; and Christian Aid. (2010). *Saving Lives Together: A Review of Security Collaboration between the United Nations and Humanitarian Actors on the Ground*. Retrieved on 21 March 2018 from https://reliefweb.int/report/world/saving-lives-together-review-security-collaboration-between-united-nations-and.

## Standard 7: Safety and Security of Local Partner Organizations

*Signatories shall endeavour to achieve the above six Standards in implementing a project with a local partner organization , based on mutual respect and shared responsibility.*

**Key Actions:**

- In implementing a project in partnership with a local organization, clarify roles and responsibilities of both parties in case of critical incidents and for day-to-day operations (see also Guidance Note 2 (P65), Standard 2.3 Guidance Notes 4 (P37))
- When a staff member of the organization works with a local organization, both sides provide information about potential security risks, staff's roles and responsibilities, and vulnerabilities, prior to project implementation. (see also Guidance Notes 1 (P64), 3 (P65), Standard 2.1 Guidance Note 5 Full Participation of National/Local Staff in Security Planning (P23)).
- To work with local implementing partners in high-risk areas and countries, both sides need to understand potential security risks for the local organization and the funding NGO's risk threshold (e.g. reputational risks). Transferring high risks to the local organization in an unintended way should be avoided. (See Guidance Note 4 (P65), Standard 2.1 Guidance Note 4 (P21), Standard 2.3 Guidance Note 1 (P36))

**Key Indicators:**

- When implementing a project with a local partner entity, the organization should understand the security risks that they may face, respect their safety and security policies, and agree on the security risk measures to be taken. These arrangements should also be written in a memorandum of understanding (MOU).
- Close and smooth communication with local partners is ensured. Costs for consultation meetings in a third country or invitation to the funding agency's headquarters are secured.
- In accordance with the security compliance ability of local partner organizations, it is necessary for funding organizations to secure human resources and training opportunities, and to ensure there are sufficient resources for equipment and materials for security measures including crime prevention.

**Guidance Notes:**

1. **Working with local partners**:

Implementing projects with local organization is an effective way. The number of projects implemented in such a way has been increasing, as the number of humanitarian crises is increasing across the world. The employing organization still retains the legal duty of care responsibilities and must ensure that the security risk management of the partner organization is appropriate to meet these responsibilities. Both parties need to understand each other's different security standards and risk attitudes.

- International NGOs enter into implementation agreements with local partner organizations, regardless of the security situation. Even in such cases, all the above six Standards should be met as there always exist risks associated with crimes, diseases, and accidents.
- When a project is managed remotely without international staff's presence, both organizations need to agree on day-to-day security measures, in addition to travel security risk management.
- When a staff member of the organization is hosted by a local organization, or when a project is implemented by a local organization and responsibilities for security are under its management, it would be desirable to conduct a joint security risk assessment to agree on security measures to be taken. These arrangements should be written in the MOU.
- It is important to maintain close communication with the local organization and to make sure that necessary security arrangements are in place when the project is fully remotely managed and no staff travel is involved.

**2. Points to include in the agreement:**

- Visibility: Depending on the security situation, organizations may refrain from using logos and signs of donors, own organization, and local partner organizations.
- Decision-making roles in the field: Clarify responsibilities of the local representative so that they can make appropriate decisions.
- Public relations: When ethnic and/or religious tensions are observed, the NGO must be aware that they ways in which they write about these could potentially affect their programme activities. Special attention needs to be paid to the ways in which international staff movement is communicated.
- Ensure that most updated information is shared between the funding organization and the local organization, including SOP and security management plan arrangements.
- Emergency response: Clearly identify what triggers evacuation and programme suspension, and also financial settlement mechanism.

3. **Communication with Local Partner Organizations**: Close communication is vital for taking security measures among different organizations. It is necessary to formulate project plans in collaboration with local partner organizations and to communicate frequently during project implementation. It is also important to exchange opinions directly with the staff of local partner organizations through business trips and on-site visits as well as usual communication by e-mail, telephone, etc. Especially when organizations cannot visit the project site due to deterioration of security, etc., it is necessary to try to meet the staff of local partner organizations in a different country.

4. **Security Measures on Relocation**: When the project is suspended temporarily or terminated in the middle due to deterioration of the security situation, organizations should take appropriate measures not only for their own staff but also the staff of the local partner organization. Even if the organization evacuates only its own staff and the

project continues with the local partner team staying, it is important to consider possible security risks and take countermeasures.

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